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Abstract
We propose a logic of interactive proofs as a framework for an intu-
itionistic foundation for interactive computation, which we construct via
an interactive analog of the Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski-Arte¨mov definition
of Intuitionistic Logic as embedded into a classical modal logic of proofs,
and of the Curry-Howard isomorphism between intuitionistic proofs and
typed programs. Our interactive proofs effectuate a persistent epistemic
impact in their intended communities of peer reviewers that consists in the
induction of the (propositional) knowledge of their proof goal by means
of the (individual) knowledge of the proof with the interpreting reviewer.
That is, interactive proofs effectuate a transfer of propositional knowl-
edge (knowable facts) via the transmission of certain individual knowledge
(knowable proofs) in multi-agent distributed systems. In other words, we
as a community can have the formal common knowledge that a proof
is that which if known to one of our peer members would induce the
knowledge of its proof goal with that member. Last but not least, we
prove non-trivial interactive computation as definable within our simply
typed interactive Combinatory Logic to be nonetheless equipotent to non-
interactive computation as defined by simply typed Combinatory Logic.
Keywords agents as knowledge processors, proof- and signature-checkers,
and reduction relations; communication channels as variable bindings;
constructive Kripke-semantics; cryptographic and interpreted communi-
cation; interactive and oracle computation; proof equality; proofs as cer-
tificates, messages, and sufficient evidence; propositions as types.
∗Work funded mostly with Grant P 08742 from the Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science, and to a lesser extent with Grant AFR 894328 from the National Research Fund
Luxembourg cofunded under the Marie-Curie Actions of the European Commission (FP7-
COFUND). A preliminary version of Section 1.1 and 1.2 appeared in [Kra10a, not peer-
reviewed] and another of Sections 1.1—1.3 in [Kra10b, peer-reviewed].
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1 Introduction
The subject matter of this paper is a formal logic of interactive proofs serving as
a framework for an intuitionistic foundation of interactive computation between
multiple agents in distributed systems. Due to its ambitious goal, it cannot be
light-weight, and comprehending it may well resemble the experience described
by the Indian parable of the blind men and an elephant. In order to help our
readers perceive and find again the various parts of our elephant, we have chosen
to prefer serious structuring and (perhaps over-)emphasising over more light-
weight linear chatting, which would be more entertaining but in our opinion
also distracting (important points and structure could go unnoticed or get lost).
1.1 Motivation, Goal & Problem
1.1.1 Motivation
In [GSW06], interactive computation is proposed as the new, to-be-defined
paradigm of computation, as opposed to the old paradigm of non-interactive
computation in the sense of the old sages like Turing and others. The motiva-
tion for this paper is the consensus of the contributors to [GSW06], which is
that the purpose of interactive computation ultimately is not the computation
of result values, to which we consent, but the possibly unending interaction
itself, from which we dissent. Interaction may well be unending, but it can-
not be a self-purpose because if it were then all interactive programs would be
quines—rhetorically exaggerated. (A quine [re]produces itself and only itself.)
1.1.2 Goal
Our goal is to reach consensus with the reader that values are only the means—
not the ends—of interactive computation, and that the purpose of interac-
tive computation is interpreted communication between distributed
man or machine agents interacting via message passing. Note that the
communication medium can be modelled as a machine agent. For example in
communication security, which is an important application of interactive com-
putation, the communication medium is an adversarial agent [Kra15].
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1.1.3 Problem
So what is interpreted communication? According to Shannon [Sha48]:1
The fundamental problem of [uninterpreted] communication is that
of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a mes-
sage selected at another point.
In analogy, we declare:
The fundamental problem of interpreted communication is that of
[re]producing at one point either exactly or approximately the in-
tended meaning of a message selected at another point.
Note that due to the distribution of the different agents in a communication
network, who may have different views of the system, the agents constitute dif-
ferent message interpretation contexts. Hence, identical messages may well be
interpreted differently in different contexts, and thus have different meanings
to different agents. As a matter of fact, message misinterpretations are ubiq-
uitous in man or machine communications, e.g., in communication protocols
[And08, Chapter 3], and may have serious or even catastrophic consequences,
e.g., in the context of nuclear command and control [And08, Chapter 13]. In-
deed, [re]producing intended message meaning across interpretation contexts is
a highly critical and non-trivial problem. But what is message meaning?
In [Kra07b], we argue that the (denotational) meaning of a message in a
given interpretation context is the propositional knowledge that the individual
knowledge of that message induces in that context (cf. Section 2.3). (See [PR03]
for a related notion of message meaning.) By individual knowledge we mean
knowledge in the sense of the transitive use of the verb “to know,” here to know
a message, such as the plaintext of an encrypted message. Notation: a kM for
“agent a knows message M” (cf. Definition 1). This is the classic concept of
knowledge de re (“of a thing”) made explicit for message things and meaning
here taking them apart (analysing) and putting them again together (synthe-
sising). Whereas by propositional knowledge we mean knowledge in the sense
of the use of the verb “to know” with a clause, here to know that a statement
is true, such as that the plaintext of an encrypted message is (individually) un-
known to potential adversaries. Notation: Ka(φ) for “agent a knows that φ [is
true]” (cf. Section 2.3). This is the classic concept of knowledge de dicto (“of
a fact”).2 Notice that we make the distinction between individual and proposi-
tional knowledge with respect to the “object” of knowledge (the known), that is,
with respect to a message and clause, respectively. However, individual as well
as propositional knowledge can both be individual with respect to the subject
of knowledge (the knower), that is, an (individual) agent.
Hence, an agent-centric paraphrase of our previous problem statement is:
1The standard typographic convention of brackets occurring within in-lined or displayed
quoted text indicates that the text within the brackets does not occur in the original text.
So, “[uninterpreted]” indicates that “uninterpreted” does not occur in the original text.
2 In a first-order setting, knowledge de re and de dicto can be related with Barcan-laws.
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The fundamental problem of communication is that of inducing at
one point either an intended knowledge or an intended belief with a
message selected at another point (cf. Section 2.3 for formal mean-
ings).
With this paper, we intend to induce (necessarily true) knowledge, and leave
induction of (possibly false) belief for further work. (For our standard notions
of belief and knowledge, see [MV07].) Here, interactive computations compute
propositional knowledge (e.g., that the goal of this paper has been achieved),
and they do so by passing as messages pieces of interactively or non-interactively
computed individual knowledge (e.g., this paper). Again, result values are only
the means—not the ends—of interactive computations.
1.2 Solution & Methodology
1.2.1 Solution
Our problem statement contains an inceptive solution and defining principle for
interactive computation, namely induction of knowledge (cf. Section 2.3). Our
task is thus to make this principle precise. This in turn leads us to defining
the concept of an interactive proof (or certificate) whose effect is to induce the
knowledge of its proof goal (or statement of certification) in the intended inter-
pretation context (cf. Section 2.3). Thereby, we identify proofs (and thus cer-
tificates) with messages (for more views on these three concepts, see [Asp12])):
Messages as proofs Any (well-formed) message, cryptographic or not, can
prove something (cf. Theorem 2.15) and thus is a (potential) proof.
Proofs as messages Any proof (a finite syntactic object) can obviously be
transmitted and thus is a (potential) message.
The present paper is intended to be such an interactive proof: its proof goal is
the goal stated in Section 1.1.2, and its intended interpretation context is the set
of logically educated readers fluent in English. Note that our interactive proofs,
just like proof constructions defined in terms of interactive Turing-machines
[GMR89], need not have a proof-tree structure in the sense of classical proof
theory [Bus98a]. Our interactive proofs are also formal social proofs in that they
partially reconcile two distinct viewpoints on mathematical proofs [Bus98b]:
The first view is that proofs are social conventions by which
mathematicians convince one another of the truth of theorems. That
is to say, a proof is expressed in natural language plus possibly sym-
bols and figures, and is sufficient to convince an expert of the cor-
rectness of a theorem. Examples of social proofs include the kinds
of proofs that are presented in conversations or published in articles.
Of course, it is impossible to precisely define what constitutes a valid
proof in this social sense; and, the standards for valid proofs may
vary with the audience and over time. The second view of proofs is
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more narrow in scope: in this view, a proof consists of a string of
symbols which satisfy some precisely stated set of rules and which
prove a theorem, which itself must also be expressed as a string of
symbols. According to this view, mathematics can be regarded as
a ‘game’ played with strings of symbols according to some precisely
defined rules. Proofs of the latter kind are called “formal” proofs to
distinguish them from “social” proofs.
Note that a theorem known by one (say a) but not by another mathematician
(say b) is a local truth from the viewpoint of an audience (say {a, b}). An
example of a social convention is a work contract (cf. Lemma 3 and Corollary 7).
1.2.2 Methodology
Our methodology for defining interactive computation emerges as an interac-
tive variant of a classical construction that consists in a “horizontal” transitive
embedding of programs into proofs and in a “vertical” homomorphing of each
non-interactive structure into its interactive counterpart (cf. Figure 1). We will
argue that the lower right-most “vertical” homomorphism (without ⊂-tail) can-
not be an embedding (with ⊂-tail) and that this reflects the essential difference
between interactivity and non-interactivity here. So here, we shall present:
1. a classical modal logic (LiP) of interactive proofs that
(a) are agent-centric generalisations of non-interactive proofs such that
the agents are resource-unbounded with respect to individual and
thus also propositional knowledge (cf. Section 4.2.2), though our
agents here are still unable to guess individual (and thus also propo-
sitional) knowledge;
(b) induce the knowledge of their proof goal with their intended inter-
preting agent(s) such that the induced knowledge is propositional in
the sense of the standard modal logic of knowledge S5 [FHMV95,
MV07, HR10].
(See [Kra07a, Kra08a] and [Kra08b] for preliminary, non-axiomatic explo-
rations within different, non-standard semantics, but in [Kra08b] already
with pairing and signing as proof-term constructors.)
2. a classical modal logic (iS4) of interactive provability via an embedding
into an epistemically guarded first-order extension (egFOLiP) of LiP in
loose analogy with Arte¨mov’s embedding of the standard modal logic of
non-arithmetic3 provability S4 into his Logic of Proofs LP [Art94, Art01,
Art07]. (To make the analogy tighter, one could equip LiP with term
variables as LP is equipped with, and attempt a corresponding embedding.
However, we find our present embedding a bit more natural in our setting.)
3i.e., not internalising provability of a formal system that includes Peano Arithmetic
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Figure 1: Typed interactive programs from interactive proofs
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3. interactive Intuitionistic Logic (iIL) via an embedding into iS4 in analogy
with the Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski embedding of Intuitionistic Logic IL into
S4 [Art07], which will turn out to be the non-modal fragment of [Kra15].
4. (untyped) interactive Combinatory Logic (iCL) as a multi-agent distributed
generalisation of the classic Combinatory Logic (CL) [HS08] and as a par-
ent formalism for its following simply typed variant.
5. typed interactive Combinatory Logic (TiCL) via an isomorphism from iIL
in analogy with the Curry-Howard isomorphism between IL and typed
Combinatory Logic (TCL) [dG95, SU06].
We will deploy our methodology from right to left. egFOLiP (LP) is the rich-
est among all the (non-)interactive structures in the sense that all other (non-
)interactive structures embed into egFOLiP (LP). In result, terms viewed as
proofs are descriptions of constructive deductions, terms viewed as programs
are prescriptions for interactive computations, LiP-formulas viewed as proposi-
tions are proof goals, and LiP-formulas viewed as types are program properties.
To agents, interactive proofs are message terms that induce the propositional
knowledge of their proof goal with their intended interpreters, and interactive
computations are message communications between distributed interlocutors
that compute that knowledge from the meaning of the communicated messages.
In sum, the purpose of interactive proofs is the transfer of proposi-
tional knowledge (knowable facts) via the transmission of certain in-
dividual knowledge (knowable proofs) in multi-agent distributed sys-
tems (for example: editorial boards, scientific communities, social networks
and other virtualised societies—even the whole Internet). (In that, LiP can also
be viewed as an inductive but truthful and thus really a deductive logic, which
is about drawing conclusions [obtaining factual knowledge] from observed data
[individual knowledge] [Haw14].) That is, LiP is a formal theory of knowl-
edge transfer.4 In contrast, Shannon’s theory is about the (error-correcting)
transmission of individual knowledge (data) only.
4Knowledge being power, knowledge transfer between agents becomes agent empowerment.
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1.3 The Logic of Proofs (LP)
The language of Arte¨mov’s Logic of Proofs (LP) (cf. [Art94, Art01] and [Art07,
Section 5]) is the language of classical propositional logic enriched with formu-
las p:F , where F denotes formulas and p so-called proof polynomials.5 Proof
polynomials are terms built from proof variables x, y, z, . . . and proof constants
a, b, c, . . . by means of three operations: application ‘·’ (binary), sum ‘+’ (bi-
nary), and proof checker ‘!’ (unary). According to Arte¨mov, proof polynomials
represent the whole set of possible operations on (non-interactive) proofs for a
propositional language.
Then, the following proof system defines (the non-normal modal logic) LP:
0. all axioms of classical propositional logic
1. `LP ((p:F ) ∨ q:F )→ (p+q):F (sum)
2. `LP (p:(F → G))→ ((q:F )→ (p·q):G) (application)
3. `LP (p:F )→ F (reflection)
4. `LP (p:F )→ (!p):(p:F ) (proof checker)
5. {F → G,F} `LP G (modus ponens)
6. `LP c:A, for any axiom A and proof constant c (constant specification6),
where {F → G,F} `LP G abbreviates “if `LP F → G and `LP F then `LP G”
in horizontal Hilbert style, and ‘!’ is interpreted as a primitive-recursive program
for checking the correctness of proofs which given a proof of p produces a proof
that p proves F . The application axiom internalises the modus ponens rule.
Note that LP does not explicate beyond the formula p:F what it means
for p to prove F , but rather attempts to characterise axiomatically this rela-
tion. Indeed, p:F really stands for an atomic concept. Arguably, the standard
semantics of LP does not fully explicate the concept either: that semantics ac-
tually merely re-stipulates each axiom of LP as a corresponding condition on
the model in set-theoretic language (cf. [Art07, Section 5.3] and [Fit05]). In
that, it is rather a convenient semantic interface than a semantics proper. Here
it is. Given
• a frame (W,R) with a reflexive and transitive relation R ⊆W ×W
• an abstractly constrained evidence mapping E from worlds u and proof
polynomials p to sets of formulas F
such that:
1. if uRv then E(u, p) ⊆ E(v, p) (monotonicity)
5In that, LP (and LiP) is an example of Gabbay’s labelled deductive systems (LDS), and
its (and LiP’s) labels can be appreciated as more concrete (binder-free) implementations of
abstract (Kripke-world-quantifying) labels a` la [dQdOG12].
6Constant specification is a somewhat flexible concept (cf. [Art08a] for four variations).
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2. (closure)
• if F → G ∈ E(u, p) and F ∈ E(u, q) then G ∈ E(u, p·q) (application)
• if F ∈ E(u, p) then p:F ∈ E(u, !p) (proof checker)
• E(u, p) ∪ E(u, q) ⊆ E(u, p+q) (sum),
and a usual valuation mapping V from atomic propositions to sets of worlds,
satisfaction for the LP-modality in a model (W,R, E ,V) at a world u is so that
(W,R, E ,V), u  p:F iff
F ∈ E(u, p) and for every v ∈W , if uRv then (W,R, E ,V), v  F .
Notice the additional constraint F ∈ E(u, p), which a standard Kripke-seman-
tics format would not allow. A more serious criticism than the one of not being
a semantics proper is that in a truly interactive setting, the reflection axiom
is unsound (cf. Section 4.1). By a truly interactive setting we mean a multi-
agent distributed system where not all proofs are known by all agents, that is,
a setting with a non-trivial distribution of information (in the sense of Dana
Scott, cf. Proposition 3).
In contrast:
1. LiP will give an epistemic explication of proofs, that is, an explication of
proofs in terms of the epistemic impact that they effectuate with their
intended interpreting agents (i.e., the knowledge of their proof goal).
Technically, we will endow the proof modality with a standard Kripke-
semantics, whose accessibility relation we
(a) define constructively, in terms of elementary set-theoretic construc-
tions (in loose analogy with the constructive rather than the purely
axiomatic definition of ordered pairs [e.g., Kuratowski’s] or numbers
[Fef89]);
(b) match to an abstract semantic interface in standard form (which
abstractly stipulates the characteristic properties of the accessibility
relation [Fit07]), which entails
i. the absorption of the evidence mapping into the accessibility re-
lation (and thus the absorption of the corresponding conjunctive
constraint on the truth condition of the proof modality),
ii. the elimination of the monotonicity constraint on the evidence
mapping (in the sense that the constraint will become a prop-
erty), which is a nice side-effect of the previous simplification.
2. LiP only validates a corresponding conditional reflection principle, that is,
a reflection principle that is conditioned on the (individual) knowledge of
the proof mentioned by the principle (e.g., the above p in LP).
3. LiP is, technically speaking, a normal modal logic, which brings all the
benefits of the existing standard techniques of normal modal logics to LiP.
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Hence, we beg to differ with Arte¨mov and Nogina, who, like Aristotle and Plato,
define (propositional) knowledge as justified true belief, but unlike Aristotle and
Plato, admit as admissible justifications for such knowledge only proofs in the
sense of at least LP [AN05, Art08a]. As a counter-example to Arte¨mov and
Nogina’s provability explication of knowledge, consider that an agent may know
that a certain state of affairs is the case from the observation of a physical event
(e.g., a message input/output), yet not be able to prove her (propositional)
knowledge to the non-observers (e.g., an absent peer or judge) for lack of suffi-
cient evidence (i.e., proof). Whereas in our epistemic explication of provability,
provability possibly implies propositional knowledge, e.g., with the (individ-
ual) knowledge of a proof, but propositional knowledge does not necessarily
imply provability, e.g., without such a proof. The technical difference between
the two philosophies may be subtle but nevertheless is serious (i.e., not a mere
technicality)—especially for applications to truly distributed computer systems.
1.4 Contribution & Roadmap
1.4.1 Contribution
The contribution of this paper is, first, a formal theory of knowledge transfer,
that is, our classical normal modal Logic of interactive Proofs (LiP), serving as
a definitional framework for interactive computation via a construction analo-
gous to Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski-Arte¨mov’s, and second, our resulting interactive
structures iS4, iIL, and iCL and TiCL (the main computational structures), as
well as their interconnections. More precisely, our main contributions are:
1. a constructive Kripke-semantics for LiP’s proof modality (cf. Section 2.2.1);
2. a stateful notion of transmittable interactive proofs that
(a) are agent-centric generalisations of non-interactive proofs such that
the agents are, as said, still resource-unbounded with respect to in-
dividual and thus also propositional knowledge,
(b) have intuitive epistemic explications in that
i. they effectuate (cf. Section 2.3)
A. a persistent epistemic impact in their intended communi-
ties of peer reviewers that consists in the induction of the
(propositional) knowledge of their proof goal by means of
the (individual) knowledge of the proof with the interpreting
reviewer,
B. a transfer of propositional knowledge (knowable facts) via
the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable
proofs) in multi-agent distributed systems,
ii. the individual proof knowledge can be thought of as being pro-
vided by an imaginary computation oracle (cf. Section 2.4),
(c) are falsifiable in a communal sense of Popper’s (cf. Theorem 5),
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(d) can be constructed with only two operations, namely pairing and
signing, and freely combined with other term operations (e.g., en-
cryption),
(e) happen to have an information-theoretic explication in terms of Scott’s
information systems (cf. Proposition 3);
3. a stateful notion of proof equality in an idempotent commutative monoid
capturing equality of epistemic impact (cf. Corollary 4);
4. a novel modal rule of logical modularity, called epistemic antitonicity, for
the class of justification logics [Art08a] including LP, which allows the
partial, or even total and thus modular generation of the structural modal
laws from the laws of a separate (e.g., application-specific) term theory
(cf. Page 14 and Section 4.2.1);
5. a sound and complete axiomatisation for LiP (cf. Theorem 6);
6. a proof of the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 7) and decidability (cf.
Corollary 5) of LiP;
7. the main interactive computational calculi of Turing-powerful interactive
Combinatory Logic (iCL) and its variant, typed interactive Combinatory
Logic (TiCL),
(a) which are distributed multi-agent generalisations of their classic coun-
terparts and enable us to view agents as reduction relations
(agent-centric reduction relation) and communication channels
as variable bindings (definable agent-centric lambda-operator),
(b) by means of which interactive computation can be defined and
programmed, and shown to be equipotent to non-interactive com-
putation at the level of simple types (cf. Corollary 6)!
In sum, LiP is a minimal modular extension of propositional logic with
1. an interactively generalised additional operator (the proof modality);
2. a simplified and then interactively generalised
(a) proof-term language (only two instead of three constructors, agents
as proof- as well as signature-checkers),
(b) constructive Kripke-semantics (including evidence-mapping absorp-
tion and monotonicity-condition elimination).
3. sufficient content to serve as a definitional framework for interactive com-
putation.
With our contribution, we mean to concur with [Mos06, Page viii], where
computation theory is viewed as part of the mathematics “to be
founded,”
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since Kripke-models such as ours for LiP—conceived as a foundation for in-
teractive computation theory—are relational models of the meaning of modal
languages in the language of set theory, which in turn [Mos06, Page vii]
is the official language of mathematics, just as mathematics is the
official language of science.
1.4.2 Roadmap
In the next section, we introduce our Logic of interactive Proofs (LiP) axiomat-
ically by means of a compact closure operator that induces the Hilbert-style
proof system that we seek (cf. Proposition 1) and that allows the simple gen-
eration of application-specific extensions of LiP (cf. Page 15). We then prove
some useful (further-used), deducible laws within the obtained system, as well
as a correspondence theorem (Theorem 3). Next, we introduce the construc-
tive semantics and the semantic interface for LiP. For the construction of the
semantics, we again make use of a closure operator, but this time on sets of mes-
sages to be used as interactive proofs. In Section 2.3, we present the promised
epistemic explication and in Section 2.4 the promised oracle-computational ex-
plication of our interactive proofs. In Section 2.5, we demonstrate the adequacy
of our proof system and the decidability of its set of generated theorems (the
logic), and present our notion of proof equality for LiP. In Section 3, we present
our resulting interactive structures iS4, iIL, iCL and TiCL, as well as their
interconnections. Finally, we relate LiP to LP-like systems in Section 4.
2 Basic Logic of interactive Proofs (LiP)
2.1 Syntactically
The basic Logic of interactive Proofs (LiP) provides a modal formula language
over a generic message or proof term language. The formula language offers
the classical propositional connectives, a relational symbol ‘ k ’ for constructing
atomic propositions about individual (term) knowledge, and a parameterised
unary modal constructor ‘ : ’ for propositions about proofs. The term language
offers constructors for pairing and (possibly cryptographically implemented)
signing. (Signature creation and verification is in polynomial time [Kat10].)
Definition 1 (The language of LiP). Let
• A 6= ∅ designate a non-empty finite set of agent names a, b, c, etc. such
that CM ∈ A, where CM designates the communication medium;
• C ⊆ A denote (finite and not necessarily disjoint) communities (sets) of
agents a ∈ A (referred to by their name);
• M 3M ::= a ∣∣ Ka ∣∣ Sa ∣∣ (M,M) ∣∣ {[M ]}a ∣∣ B
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Table 1: Some macro-definable proof concepts
M ÷Ca φ := M :Ca ¬φ
(M is a C ∪ {a}-reviewable refutation of φ to a)
M Ca φ := ¬(M ÷Ca φ)
(M is a C ∪ {a}-reviewable proof diamond of φ to a)
M YCa φ := (M :Ca φ) ∨ (M ÷Ca φ)
(M is a C ∪ {a}-reviewable decider of φ to a, see [Kra14])
M ZCa φ := ¬(M YCa φ)
(M is a C ∪ {a}-reviewable non-decider of φ to a)
designate our language of message terms M over A with constants a ∈ A,
Ka, and Sa, message pairs (M,M), signed messages {[M ]}a, and application-
specific data B (left blank here); note that messages must be grammati-
cally well-formed, which yields an induction principle, and that the meta-
variable B just signals the possibility of an extended term language M;
• P designate a set of atomic propositions P , first, constrained so that for
all a ∈ A and M ∈M, (a kM) ∈ P (for individual knowledge “a knows
M”) are propositional constants (not substitutable as such), and second,
containing countably infinitely many propositional variables (substitutable
as such);
• L 3 φ ::= P ∣∣ ¬φ ∣∣ φ ∧ φ ∣∣ M :Ca φ
designate our language of logical formulas φ, where M :Ca φ means that “M
is a C ∪ {a}-reviewable proof of φ” in the sense that “M can prove φ to
a (e.g., a designated verifying judge) and this fact is commonly known in
the (pointed) community C ∪ {a} (e.g., for C being a jury).”
The purpose of our term constants Ka and Sa is to act as basic combinators
in concert with term pairing (explicit application) in the sense of Combina-
tory Logic (CL) [HS08]. Thus, our message language M contains a copy of
the language of closed (variable-free) CL-terms (combinators) per agent a (cf.
Section 3.3). Of course, we could also conceive of term forms, that is, terms
containing free variables x, x′, x′′ ∈ X with X a countably infinite set, and thus
have a copy of the full language of CL per agent as sublanguages of M. How-
ever, in order to keep the introduction of our logic as simple as possible and
as complicated as necessary, we do not introduce term forms here. For a tech-
nical discussion of our set of atomic propositions, see Appendix D. Now note
the following macro-definitions: > := a k a, ⊥ := ¬>, φ ∨ φ′ := ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′),
φ→ φ′ := ¬φ∨φ′, φ↔ φ′ := (φ→ φ′)∧(φ′ → φ), and, more interestingly those
in Table 1.7 Variations on our notions of interactive proof can also be macro-
defined, e.g., with respect to reviewer communities (by conjunction with respect
to their members and based on a policy of either one [dis]proof for all members
7The problem of defining interactive refutations was suggested to me by Rajeev Gore´.
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or one [dis]proof for each member) and with respect to exclusive communities
(members only).
LiP is defined by means of the following axiom and deduction-rule schemas,
where grey-shading highlights special, mostly modal interest.
Definition 2 (The axioms and deduction rules of LiP). Let
• Γ0 designate an adequate set of axioms for classical propositional logic
• Γ1 := Γ0 ∪ {
– a k a (knowledge of one’s own name string)
– a kM → a k {[M ]}a (personal signature synthesis)
– a k {[M ]}b → a k (M, b) (universal signature analysis)
– (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′) ([un]pairing)
– (M :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ ((M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′) (Kripke’s law, K)
– (M :Ca φ)→ (a kM → φ) (epistemic truthfulness)
– (M :Ca φ)→ ¬(M :Ca ¬φ) (proof consistency)
– (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a} {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ) (peer review)
– (M :C∪C
′
a φ)→M :Ca φ (group decomposition) }
designate a set of axiom schemas.
Then, LiP := Cl(∅) := ⋃n∈N Cln(∅), where for all Γ ⊆ L:
Cl0(Γ) := Γ1 ∪ Γ
Cln+1(Γ) := Cln(Γ) ∪
{ φ′ | {φ, φ→ φ′} ⊆ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (modus ponens, MP)
{ M :Ca φ | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (necessitation, N)
{ (M ′ :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ | (a kM → a kM ′) ∈ Cln(Γ) }
(epistemic antitonicity).
We call LiP the base theory, and Cl(Γ) an LiP-theory for any Γ ⊆ L.
This article is about the base theory (the logic), as suggested by the article title.
Notice the logical order of LiP, which is, due to propositions about (proofs of)
propositions, higher-order propositional. Further, observe that we assume the
existence of a dependable mechanism for signing messages, which we model with
the above synthesis and analysis axioms. In trusted multi-agent distributed sys-
tems, signatures are unforged, and thus such a mechanism is trivially given by
the inclusion of the sender’s name in the sent message, or by the sender’s senso-
rial impression on the receiver when communication is immediate. In distrusted
multi-agent distributed systems (e.g., the open Internet, with a communication
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medium), a practically unforgeable signature mechanism can be implemented
with classical certificate-based or, more directly, with identity-based public-key
cryptography [Kat10]. We also assume the existence of a pairing mechanism
modelling finite sets via individual knowledge. Such a mechanism is required by
the important application of communication (not only cryptographic) protocols
[And08, Chapter 3], in which concatenation of high-level data packets is associa-
tive, commutative, and idempotent for an individual knower (cf. Corollary 4).
What is more, our peer-review axiom happens to be a possible formalisation of
one key property of Miller’s foundational proof certificates, which is the one of
them being communicable as well as acceptable within a group of peers [Mil14]
(see our Section 2.3).
As examples of application-specific data B we conceive of:
• atomic data other than the present term constants such as random num-
bers (used in cryptographic communication), quoted formulas pφq (e.g.,
the Go¨del-number of φ in some Go¨del-numbering scheme)8, and others;
• compound data such as
– hashed9 data dMe, for M ∈M and with axiom a kM → a k dMe
– encrypted data [M ]M ′ , for plaintext data M ∈ M and data used as
a symmetric encryption key M ′ ∈M, and with axioms
∗ a k (M,M ′)→ a k [M ]M ′ (encryption)
∗ a k ([M ]M ′ ,M ′)→ a kM (decryption)
This is the so-called Dolev-Yao conception of cryptography [DY83],
which we could easily cast as the following LiP-theory10
LiPDY := Cl({a kM → a k dMe,
a k (M,M ′)→ a k [M ]M ′ ,
a k ([M ]M ′ ,M
′)→ a kM}).
Finally, we could close individual knowledge under certain equational theories
by adding a relational symbol ‘=’ for equality together with its standard axioms
plus the specific axiom schema
(a kM ∧M = M ′)→ a kM ′ (epistemic equational closure).
An example of such a notion of equality is the one of the equational theory of
interactive combinators, which can be defined by the following three additional
axiom schemas (adapting from classical, unsubscripted combinators [HS08]):
8Quotation is a form of type down-casting in the sense that data viewed as compound at a
certain logical level (here, at the formula-language level) is viewed as atomic at a lower level
(here, at the term-language level), and thus is a form of encoding meta-data (here, statements
about messages) in object data (here, messages).
9Cryptographic hash functions are one-way functions with certain cryptographically inter-
esting properties such as collision and preimage resistance.
10The integration of other conceptions such as the classical information-theoretic [Sha49]
and the modern complexity-theoretic [Gol01, Gol04] will be presented in future work.
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• ((Ka,M),M ′) = M
• (((Sa,M),M ′),M ′′) = ((M,M ′′), (M ′,M ′′))
• ¬(Ka = Sb)
However, the epistemic equational closure resulting from this theory would be
too strong: closing individual knowledge under ((Ka,M),M
′) = M would give
agents a arbitrary term-guessing power (of arbitrary terms M ′)! On the other
hand, closing individual knowledge selectively just under (((Sa,M),M
′),M ′′) =
((M,M ′′), (M ′,M ′′)) is not needed, since it already is (cf. Corollary 1).
Some other candidate axioms the reader might want to consider are: (Ka =
Kb)→ a = b, (Sa = Sb)→ a = b, (a k Kb ∨ a k Sb)→ a k b, and a k b→ a k (Kb, Sb).
If added to LiP, the last axiom would imply the individual knowledge of all
non-interactive programs and thus such algorithms (choose b to be a)!
Note that in the sequel, “:iff” abbreviates “by definition, if and only if”.
Logicians may want to skip the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Hilbert-style proof system). Let
Φ `LiP φ :iff if Φ ⊆ LiP then φ ∈ LiP
φ a`LiP φ′ :iff {φ} `LiP φ′ and {φ′} `LiP φ
`LiP φ :iff ∅ `LiP φ.
In other words, `LiP ⊆ 2L ×L is a system of closure conditions in the sense of
[Tay99, Definition 3.7.4]. For example:
1. for all axioms φ ∈ Γ1, `LiP φ
2. for modus ponens, {φ, φ→ φ′} `LiP φ′
3. for necessitation, {φ} `LiP M :Ca φ
4. for epistemic antitonicity, {a kM → a kM ′} `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ.
(In the space-saving, horizontal Hilbert-notation “ Φ `LiP φ”, Φ is not a set of
hypotheses but a set of premises, see for example modus ponens, necessitation,
and epistemic antitonicity.11)
Then `LiP can be viewed as being defined by a Cl-induced Hilbert-style proof
system. In fact Cl : 2L → 2L is a standard consequence operator, that is, a
substitution-invariant compact closure operator:
1. Γ ⊆ Cl(Γ) (extensivity)
2. if Γ ⊆ Γ′ then Cl(Γ) ⊆ Cl(Γ′) (monotonicity)
11So for example modus ponens can be presented on one line and even in-line as {φ, φ →
φ′} `LiP φ′ rather than on two display lines as
φ φ→ φ′
φ′
.
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3. Cl(Cl(Γ)) ⊆ Cl(Γ) (idempotency)
4. Cl(Γ) =
⋃
Γ′∈2Γfinite Cl(Γ
′) (compactness)
5. σ[Cl(Γ)] ⊆ Cl(σ[Γ]) (substitution invariance),
where σ designates an arbitrary propositional L-substitution.
Proof. That a Hilbert-style proof system can be viewed as induced by a compact
closure operator is well-known (e.g., see [Gab95]); that Cl is indeed such an
operator can be verified by inspection of the inductive definition of Cl; and
substitution invariance follows from our definitional use of axiom schemas.12
We are now going to present some useful (further-used), deducible structural
laws of LiP, including the deducible non-structural rule of epistemic bitonicity,
used in the deduction of some of them. Here, “structural” means “deduced
exclusively from term axioms.” The laws are enumerated in a (total) order that
respects (but cannot reflect) their respective proof prerequisites.
Theorem 1 (Some useful deducible structural laws).
1. `LiP a k (M,M ′)→ a kM (left projection, 1-way K-combinator property )
2. `LiP a k (M,M ′)→ a kM ′ (right projection)
3. `LiP a k (M,M)↔ a kM (pairing idempotency)
4. `LiP a k (M,M ′)↔ a k (M ′,M) (pairing commutativity)
5. `LiP (a kM → a kM ′)↔ (a k (M,M ′)↔ a kM)
(neutral pair elements)
6. `LiP a k (M,a)↔ a kM (self-neutral pair element)
7. `LiP a k (M, (M ′,M ′′))↔ a k ((M,M ′),M ′′) (pairing associativity)
8. {a kM ↔ a kM ′} `LiP (M :Ca φ)↔M ′ :Ca φ (epistemic bitonicity)
9. `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ (M ′,M) :Ca φ (proof extension, left)
10. `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ (proof extension, right)
11. `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨M ′ :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ (proof extension)
12. `LiP ((M,M) :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ (proof idempotency)
13. `LiP ((M,M ′) :Ca φ)↔ (M ′,M) :Ca φ (proof commutativity)
14. {a kM → a kM ′} `LiP ((M,M ′) :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ
(neutral proof elements)
12Alternatively to axiom schemas, we could have used axioms together with an additional
substitution-rule set { σ[φ] | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } in the definiens of Cln+1(Γ).
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15. `LiP ((M,a) :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ (self-neutral proof element)
16. `LiP ((M, (M ′,M ′′)) :Ca φ)↔ ((M,M ′),M ′′) :Ca φ (proof associativity)
17. `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ (self-signing elimination)
18. `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨ b :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}b :Ca φ (signing introduction)
19. `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ (self-signing idempotency)
20. When A = {a} (singleton society) and M\ {Ka, Sa}:
(a) `LiP a kM (total knowledge)
(b) `LiP a kM ↔ a kM ′ (epistemic indifference)
(c) `LiP (M :Ca φ)↔M ′ :Ca φ (proof indifference).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proof extension and idempotency jointly define proof redundancy. For a dis-
cussion of the hypothetical cases where A = {a} and M \ {Ka, Sa} (thought
experiment), see Appendix C. Next, the 1-way K-combinator property and the
following simple corollary of Theorem 1 jointly establish the fact that our agents
can be viewed as combinators in the sense of Combinatory Logic (CL) viewed as
a (non-equational) theory of term reduction [HS08]. The implicational converse
of the K-combinator property, that is, a kM → a k (M,M ′), must (and does) fail
(i.e., 6`LiP a kM → a k (M,M ′) by consistency), since otherwise agents would
have arbitrary term-guessing power (as already explained), which would invali-
date our modelling of the non-trivial distribution of information among agents.
Corollary 1 (S-combinator property).
1. `LiP a k ((M,M ′),M ′′)↔ a k ((M,M ′′), (M ′,M ′′))
2. `LiP (((M,M ′),M ′′) :Ca φ)↔ ((M,M ′′), (M ′,M ′′)) :Ca φ
Proof. (1) follows from the idempotency (copy M ′′), commutativity, and asso-
ciativity of pairing; and (2) follows from (1) and epistemic bitonicity.
Note that thanks to the modular set-up of LiP, epistemic antitonicity would
equally easily yield the application-specific modal laws for:
• hashing: (dMe :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ
• encryption: ([M ]M ′ :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ
• decryption: (M :Ca φ)→ ([M ]M ′ ,M ′) :Ca φ
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We are continuing to present also some useful (further-used), deducible logi-
cal laws of LiP. Here, “logical” means “not structural” in the previously defined
sense. Also these laws are enumerated in an order that respects their respective
proof prerequisites. Our resulting library of structural and logical laws is, analo-
gously to a programming library, very useful when it comes to actually proving
more applied theorems of—rather than meta-theorems about—our logic, and
gives technical insights into its inner workings (consequences of axiom choices).
Theorem 2 (Some useful deducible logical laws).
1. `LiP (M :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ′ :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ′)
( generalised Kripke-law, GK )
2. {φ→ φ′} `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′ (regularity, R)
3. {φ↔ φ′} `LiP (M :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ′ (R bis)
4. {a kM → a kM ′, φ→ φ′} `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′ (epistemic R, ER)
5. {a kM ↔ a kM ′, φ↔ φ′} `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ′ (ER bis)
6. `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∧M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) (proof conjunctions)
7. `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :Ca φ′)↔M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) (proof conjunctions bis)
8. `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) (proof disjunctions)
9. `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨M :Ca φ′)→M :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) (proof disjunctions bis)
10. `LiP M :Ca > (anything can prove tautological truth)
11. `LiP (a :Ca φ)→ φ (self-truthfulness)
12. φ a`LiP a :Ca φ (self-truthfulness bis)
13. `LiP ¬(M :Ca ⊥) (nothing can prove falsehood)
14. `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM) ( authentic knowledge )
15. `LiP M :∅a a kM (self-knowledge)
16. a kM → φ a`LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) ( authentic epistemic N, AEN )
17. a kM → a kM ′ a`LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM ′) (AEN bis)
18. a kM → φ a`LiP M :∅a φ (self-epistemic N, SEN)
19. a kM → a kM ′ a`LiP M :∅a a kM ′ (SEN bis)
20. `LiP a k {[M ]}b → b kM ( message attribution )
21. `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) (simple peer review)
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22. `LiP (M :C∪C′a φ)→ ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :C
′
a φ) (group decomposition bis)
23. `LiP (M :C∪{a}a φ)↔ (M :Ca φ) (self-neutral group element)
24. `LiP M :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) (self-proof of truthfulness)
25. `LiP M :Ca (¬(M :Ca ⊥)) (self-proof of proof consistency)
26. `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ))
(simple peer review bis)
27. `LiP (M :Ca (M :Ca φ))↔M :Ca φ (modal idempotency)
28. When A = {a} (singleton society) and M\ {Ka, Sa},
(a) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ φ (truthfulness)
(b) φ a`LiP M :Ca φ (truthfulness bis)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Kripke’s laws (K and GK) and the law of modal idempotency are discussed
in Section 4.2.2. The key to their validity is that LiP-agents are resource-
unbounded (though are unable to guess) and act themselves as proof checkers
(no need for LP’s ‘!’). Notice that regularity and epistemic antitonicity resemble
each other in that both laws relate an implicational premise with an implica-
tional conclusion about proof modalities, but while regularity relates the modal-
ity operands monotonically, epistemic antitonicity relates the proof parameters
antitonically. Both laws are combined in the law of epistemic regularity. The
following remark flags an important observation.
Remark 1 (BHK- or realisability interpretation of LiP-terms). The laws of
proof conjunctions, proof disjunctions, and GK (implication) mean that the
proof terms of LiP satisfy the construction interpretation of (propositional)
Intuitionistic Logic (IL) given by Brower-Heyting-Kolmogorow (the so-called
BHK- or realisability interpretation of IL) with the notable (but semantically
inessential [Fin14, Page 552 and 553]) difference that unordered (cf. Corollary 4)
pairing suffices as constructor (no need for choice constructors for disjunction).
(Also, recall that negation is definable in terms of implication and falsehood.)
Given the classicality of our interactive proof terms, their constructiveness in
the sense of BHK-realisability is a remarkable feature of them. Thus, BHK-
realisability does not characterise IL, since not only IL satisfies it.
Fact 1 (Normality). LiP is a normal modal logic.
Proof. By Kripke’s law, modus ponens, necessitation, and substitution invari-
ance (cf. Proposition 1).
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In contrast, LP is, technically speaking, not a normal modal logic [Art07, Sec-
tion 5].
The following theorem asserts an important correspondence between classical
propositional logic (PL) and LiP.
Theorem 3 (Internalisation/Externalisation Property). For all formulas ϕ of
the language of classical propositional logic PL with atomic propositions a kM :
1. {a kM} `PL ϕ if and only if `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b ϕ) ;
2. {a kM} `PL ϕ if and only if `LiP M :∅a ϕ.
Proof. Let ϕ (and ϕ′ and ϕ′′) designate a formula of the language of PL. Then,
for (1), apply the Deduction Theorem (DT) of PL ({ϕ′} `PL ϕ iff `PL ϕ′ → ϕ)
and authentic epistemic necessitation (AEN) of LiP, both in both ways, and the
definitional fact that LiP contains PL (`PL ϕ′′ iff `LiP ϕ′′); and for (2), proceed
as with (1) but apply self-epistemic necessitation (SEN) instead of AEN.
The following corollary may be viewed as a corroboration of Remark 1.
Corollary 2 (Internalisation Property of IL into LiP). For all ϕ of the language
of intuitionistic propositional logic IL with atomic propositions a kM :13
1. if {a kM} `IL ϕ then `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :Cb ϕ) ;
2. if {a kM} `IL ϕ then `LiP M :∅a ϕ.
Proof. Proceed as for the proof of Theorem 3, but apply AEN only from left to
right, and additionally apply the fact that IL ( PL.
This corollary can be partially (for the communication medium CM only) strength-
ened in the sense of Theorem 3.2 in the (intuitionistic) Logic of intuitionistic
interactive Proofs (LIiP) [Kra15], so that for all ϕ of the language of IL with
atomic propositions CM kM ,
{CM kM} `IL ϕ if and only if `LIiP M ±CM ϕ.
2.2 Semantically
2.2.1 Concretely
We now present the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard
abstract semantic interface for LiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the
proof system with respect to this interface. The core ingredient of the concrete
semantics of LiP are so-called input histories, which were introduced in [Kra14].
Input histories are finite words of input events and serve as concrete states s ∈ S
in the state space S, on which the concrete and abstract accessibility relation
MR
C
a ⊆ S × S and MRCa ⊆ S × S for LiP is defined, respectively.
13The languages of IL and PL are the same, but IL and PL (the logics) are of course not.
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Definition 3 (Semantic ingredients). For the knowledge-constructive model-
theoretic study of LiP, let
• S 3 s ::= 0 ∣∣ succMa (s) designate the concrete state space S of input his-
tories s constrained so that only a can generate a’s signature (signature
unforgeability), that is, for all s ∈ S, a, b ∈ A, and {[M ]}a ∈ clsb(∅), there
are s′, s′′ ∈ S such that s = s′?s′′ and for all c ∈ A, if {[M ]}a ∈ cls
′
c (∅) then
c = a, where 0 designates the empty input history (i.e., a zero data point,
e.g., an initial state) and succMa reads as “agent a receives message M”
(from some other, oracle agent or from herself), ? : (S ×S)→ S monoidal
concatenation on S (with neutral element 0), and cl is defined below;
• pia : S → S designate (local) state projection on a’s view such that
pia(0) := 0
pia(succ
M
b (s)) :=
{
succMb (pia(s)) if a ∈ {b, CM}, and
pia(s) otherwise;
(The communication medium CM sees any agent’s b [including its own]
input events, that is, CM has a global view on the current global state s.)
• msgs : S → 2M designate raw-data extraction such that
msgs(0) := ∅
msgs(succMa (s)) := msgs(s) ∪ {M} ;
• msgsa := msgs ◦ pia designate (local) raw-data extraction by a (the set
msgsa(s) can be viewed as a’s data base in s);
• clsa : 2M → 2M designate a data-mining operator such that clsa(D) :=
cla(msgsa(s) ∪ D) :=
⋃
n∈N cl
n
a(msgsa(s) ∪ D), where for all D ⊆M:
cl0a(D) := {a} ∪ D
cln+1a (D) := clna(D) ∪
{ (M,M ′) | {M,M ′} ⊆ clna(D) } ∪ (pairing)
{ M,M ′ | (M,M ′) ∈ clna(D) } ∪ (unpairing)
{ {[M ]}a | M ∈ clna(D) } ∪ (personal signature synthesis)
{ (M, b) | {[M ]}b ∈ clna(D) } (universal signature analysis)
(clsa(∅) can be viewed as a’s individual-knowledge base in s. For application-
specific terms such as encryption, we would have to add here the closure
conditions corresponding to their characteristic term axioms.)
• ≤a ⊆ S ×S designate a data preorder on states such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s ≤a s′ :iff clsa(∅) ⊆ cls
′
a (∅) ;
(The reader is invited to consider the effects of encryption on closure here.)
22
• ≤C := (
⋃
a∈C ≤a)∗, where ‘∗’ designates the Kleene (i.e., the reflexive
transitive) closure operation on binary relations;
• ≡a := ≤a ∩(≤a)−1 designate an equivalence relation of state indistin-
guishability, where ‘−1’ designates the converse operation on binary rela-
tions;
• MRCa ⊆ S ×S designate our concretely constructed accessibility relation—
short, concrete accessibility—for the proof modality so that for all s, s′ ∈
S,
s MR
C
a s
′ :iff s′ ∈
⋃
s ≤C∪{a} sˇ and
M ∈ clsˇa(∅)
[sˇ]≡a (1)
(iff there is sˇ ∈ S s.t. s ≤C∪{a} sˇ and M ∈ clsˇa(∅) and sˇ ≡a s′)
(See Section 2.3 for an extensive explication of this elementary construc-
tion.)
Proposition 2 (Data closure). cla : 2
M → 2M is a compact closure operator:
1. D ⊆ cla(D) (extensivity)
2. if D ⊆ D′ then cla(D) ⊆ cla(D′) (monotonicity)
3. cla(cla(D)) ⊆ cla(D) (idempotency)
4. cla(D) =
⋃
D′∈2Dfinite cla(D
′) (compactness)
Proof. By inspection of the inductive definition of cla.
The operator cla induces a relation `a ⊆ 2M ×M of data derivation such that
D `a M :iff M ∈ cla(D).
Hence, an agent a can be viewed as a data miner who mines the data D by
means of the [SD08, association] rules for pairing and signing (and possibly
other, application-specific constructors) that define the closure operator cla.
Proposition 3 (Data derivation).
Cut If D `a M and {M} `a M ′ then D `a M ′.
Compactness If D `a M then there is a finite D′ ⊆ D such that D′ `a M .
Complexity For all finite D ⊆ M, “ D `a M” is decidable in deterministic
polynomial time in the size of D and M .
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Connection to Scott information systems Let for all a ∈ A, s ∈ S, and
D ⊆M,
Csa(D) := { D′ ⊆ D | clsa(D′) = D′ }.
Further, let
Consa :=
⋃
D∈Csa(M)
2Dfinite.
Then,
〈M,Consa,`a〉
is a Scott information system, that is, for all M ∈ M, D ∈ Consa, and
D′ ⊆M:
1. {M} ∈ Consa
2. if M ∈ D then D `a M
3. if D′ ⊆ D then D′ ∈ Consa
4. if D `a M then D ∪ {M} ∈ Consa
5. if D′ ∈ Consa and D `a D′ and D′ `a M then D `a M , where
D `a D′ :iff for all M ′ ∈ D′, D `a M ′.
(Message terms are information tokens in the sense of Dana Scott [DP02,
Chapter 9].)
Proof. The cut and the compactness property follow by inspection of the defin-
ing cases of cla. The complexity follows from the complexity of message deriva-
tion for even more complex message languages (e.g., including encryption and
other constructors [TGD10] and [BRS10]). Regarding the connection to Scott
information systems: Property 1 follows from the fact that {M} ∈ 2Mfinite and
M∈ Csa(M), Property 2 from the definition of `a, Property 3 from the powerset
construction, Property 4 from the definition of `a, and Property 5 jointly from
the finiteness of D′ (which can be transformed into a message pair [of pairs])
and the cut property of `a.
Proposition 4 (Concrete accessibility).
1. If for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, s {[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b s
′
then M ∈ cls′a (∅) (signature property).
2. If M ∈ clsa(∅) then s MRCa s (conditional reflexivity).
3. There is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCa s′ (seriality).
4. For all b ∈ C∪{a}, ({[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b ◦MRCa) ⊆ MRCa (communal transitivity).
5. If C ⊆ C′ then MRCa ⊆ MRC
′
a (communal monotonicity).
6. If M ≤a M ′ then MRCa ⊆ M ′RCa (epistemic persistency).
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Proof. For (1), suppose that for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, s {[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b s
′. Hence for all
b ∈ C∪{a}, {[M ]}a ∈ cls
′
b (∅), by definition of {[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b . Hence, {[M ]}a ∈ cls
′
a (∅)
by signature unforgeability, and then M ∈ cls′a (∅) by signature analysis and
unpairing. For (2), suppose that M ∈ clsa(∅). Further, s ≤C∪{a} s and s ≡a s,
by reflexivity. Hence s MR
C
a s. For (3), let s ∈ S. Then, s ≤C∪{a} succMa (s) and
M ∈ clsuccMa (s)a (∅) and succMa (s) ≡a succMa (s). Hence s MRCa succMa (s). Thus
there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCa s′. For (4), let s, s′, s′′ ∈ S and b ∈ C∪{a} (thus
C ∪{a} = C ∪{a}∪{b}) and suppose that s {[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b s
′ and s′ MRCa s
′′. That
is, there is sˇ ∈ S such that s ≤C∪{a}∪{b} sˇ (thus s ≤C∪{a} sˇ) and {[M ]}a ∈ clsˇb(∅)
and sˇ ≡b s′ (thus sˇ ≤C∪{a}∪{b} s′ and thus sˇ ≤C∪{a} s′), and there is sˇ′ ∈ S
such that s′ ≤C∪{a} sˇ′ and M ∈ clsˇ
′
a (∅) and sˇ′ ≡a s′′. Hence s ≤C∪{a} s′ and
then s ≤C∪{a} sˇ′, both by transitivity, and thus s MRCa s′′. For (5), suppose that
C ⊆ C′. Further, let s, s′ ∈ S and suppose that s MRCa s′. That is, there is sˇ ∈ S
such that s ≤C∪{a} sˇ and M ∈ clsˇa(∅) and sˇ ≡a s′. Hence s ≤C′∪{a} sˇ, and thus
s MR
C′
a s
′. For (6), suppose that M ≤a M ′. Further, let s, s′ ∈ S and suppose
that s MR
C
a s
′. That is, there is sˇ ∈ S such that s ≤C∪{a} sˇ and M ∈ clsˇa(∅) and
sˇ ≡a s′. Hence M ′ ∈ clsˇa(∅) by the first hypothesis (expanding the definition of
≤a ⊆M×M). Thus s M ′RCa s′.
Note that we could have called the property of epistemic persistency also epis-
temic monotonicity, but have not done so, so as not to cause possible conster-
nation with the reader about the opposite naming of the corresponding axiom
of epistemic antitonicity. Axioms of modal operators and the corresponding
properties of their respective accessibility relation have the flipping tendency to
have flipped senses. (So is also the case for communal monotonicity.)
2.2.2 Abstractly
Definition 4 (Kripke-model). We define the satisfaction relation |= for LiP
such that:
(S,V), s |= P :iff s ∈ V(P )
(S,V), s |= ¬φ :iff not (S,V), s |= φ
(S,V), s |= φ ∧ φ′ :iff (S,V), s |= φ and (S,V), s |= φ′
(S,V), s |= M :Ca φ :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s MRCa s′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ ,
where
• V : P → 2S designates a usual valuation function, yet partially predefined
such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈M,
V(a kM) := { s ∈ S | M ∈ clsa(∅) }
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(If agents are Turing-machines then a knowing M can be understood as a
being able to parse M on its tape.)
• S := (S, {MRCa}M∈M,a∈A,C⊆A) designates a (modal) frame for LiP with
an abstract accessibility relation—short, abstract accessibility—MRCa ⊆
S × S for the proof modality such that
– if for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, s {[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b s
′ then M ∈ cls′a (∅)
– if M ∈ clsa(∅) then s MRCa s
– there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCa s′
– for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, ({[M ]}aR
C∪{a}
b ◦MRCa) ⊆ MRCa
– if C ⊆ C′ then MRCa ⊆ MRC
′
a
– if M ≤a M ′ then MRCa ⊆ M ′RCa
• (S,V) designates a (modal) model for LiP.
Looking back, we recognise that Proposition 4 actually establishes the important
fact that our concrete accessibility MR
C
a in Definition 3 realises all the properties
stipulated by our abstract accessibility MRCa in Definition 4; we say that
MR
C
a exemplifies (or realises) MRCa .
Further, observe that LiP has a Herbrand-style semantics, that is, logical con-
stants (agent names) and functional symbols (pairing, signing) are self-inter-
preted rather than interpreted in terms of (other, semantic) constants and func-
tions. This simplifying design choice spares our framework from the additional
complexity that would arise from term-variable assignments [BG07], which in
turn keeps our models propositionally modal. Our choice is admissible be-
cause our individuals (messages) are finite. (Infinitely long “messages” are non-
messages; they can never be completely received, e.g., transmitting irrational
numbers as such is impossible.)
Definition 5 (Truth & Validity [BvB07]).
• The formula φ ∈ L is true (or satisfied) in the model (S,V) at the state
s ∈ S :iff (S,V), s |= φ .
• The formula φ is satisfiable in the model (S,V) :iff there is s ∈ S such
that (S,V), s |= φ .
• The formula φ is globally true (or globally satisfied) in the model (S,V),
written (S,V) |= φ, :iff for all s ∈ S, (S,V), s |= φ .
• The formula φ is satisfiable :iff there is a model (S,V) and a state s ∈ S
such that (S,V), s |= φ .
• The formula φ is (universally true or) valid, written |= φ, :iff for all models
(S,V), (S,V) |= φ .
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So we can paraphrase the law of epistemic antitonicity in Definition 2 as: “What-
ever a universally poorer message M ′ can prove to a, any universally richer
message M can also prove to a, and this in all social contexts C ∪ {a}.”
Proposition 5 (Admissibility of specific axioms and rules).
1. |= a k a
2. |= a kM → a k {[M ]}a
3. |= a k {[M ]}b → a k (M, b)
4. |= (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′)
5. |= (M :Ca φ)→ (a kM → φ)
6. |= (M :Ca φ)→ ¬(M :Ca ¬φ)
7. |= (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a} {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ)
8. |= (M :C∪C′a φ)→M :Ca φ
9. If |= a kM → a kM ′ then |= (M ′ :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ .
Proof. 1–4 are immediate, and 5–9 follow directly from the conditional reflex-
ivity, the seriality, the signature property and communal transitivity, the com-
munal monotonicity, and the epistemic persistency of MRCa , respectively.
Definition 6 (Semantic consequence and equivalence).
• The formula φ′ ∈ L is a semantic consequence of φ ∈ L, written φ⇒ φ′,
:iff for all models (S,V) and states s ∈ S, if (S,V), s |= φ then (S,V), s |=
φ′.
• φ′ ∈ L is semantically equivalent to φ ∈ L, written φ ⇔ φ′, :iff φ ⇒ φ′
and φ′ ⇒ φ.
Fact 2. |= φ→ φ′ if and only if φ⇒ φ′
Proof. By expansion of definitions.
2.3 Epistemic explication
As announced, our interactive proofs have an epistemic explication in terms
of the epistemic impact that they effectuate with their intended interpreting
agents (i.e., the knowledge of their proof goals). To see this, consider that the
elementary definition of proof accessibility on Page 23 can be transformed by
applying elementary-logical rules so that
(S,V), s |= M :Ca φ if and only if
for all sˇ ∈ S, if s ≤C∪{a} sˇ then (data sˇ and peer C ∪ {a} persistent)
(S,V), sˇ |= a k M︸︷︷︸
sufficient evidence
→ Ka( φ︸︷︷︸
induced knowledge
) (epistemic impact),
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with the standard epistemic modality Ka being defined as
(S,V), sˇ |= Ka(φ) :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if sˇ ≡a s′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ.
As required, Ka—being defined by means of an equivalence relation—is S5,
that is, S4 plus the property |= ¬Ka(φ)→ Ka(¬Ka(φ)) of negative introspection
[FHMV95, MV07]. Hence, spelled out, the epistemic explication is:
A proof effectuates a persistent epistemic impact in its intended
community of peer reviewers that consists in the induction of the
(propositional) knowledge of the proof goal by means of the (in-
dividual) knowledge of the proof with the interpreting reviewer.
Observe that our notion of knowledge induction (impact effectuation) is an
instance of a parameterised persistent implication, which:
1. is compatible with C.I. Lewis relevant implication (a.k.a. strict implica-
tion), which does not stipulate any constraint on the accessibility relation
of the implication (here ≤C∪{a})
2. is intuitionistic implication in Kripke’s interpretation when the preorder
≤C∪{a} happens to be partial, e.g., when C∪{a} = {CM} (total knowledge).
D. Lewis relevant implication however (and a fortiori Stalnaker’s) is insufficient
for capturing the induction. Recall that a statement φ implies φ′ in a state s,
by definition of D. Lewis, if and only if φ → φ′ is true at all states closest to s
(here with respect to ≤C∪{a}). (Stalnaker required that there be a single closest
state.) Order-theoretically, “closest to s with respect to ≤C∪{a}” means “that
are atomic (i.e., if minored then only by bottom) in the up-set ↑≤C∪{a}(s) :=
{ s′ ∈ S | s ≤C∪{a} s′ } of s with respect to ≤C∪{a}”. Yet we do need to stipulate
truth at all states close to s (i.e., all states in ↑≤C∪{a}(s)), not just truth at all
states closest (i.e., all atomic states). Otherwise persistency, which is essential
to obtaining intuitionistic logic, may fail (cf. [vB97, Section 2] and [vB09]).
Still, we believe that D. Lewis relevant implication could be suitable for
defining induction of belief (to be enshrined in a Logic of Evidence) and even
false belief (to be enshrined in a Logic of Deception). For belief, it does not make
sense to insist on (peer) persistency, except perhaps for religious belief (among
sectarian peers), and so quantifying over all closest states could be preferable
over quantifying over all close states. This is to be explored in future work.
We close this section with the statement of five epistemic interaction laws.
The first law—to be used as a lemma for the second—describes a reflexive
interaction between individual and propositional knowledge in the following
sense.
Proposition 6 (Self-knowledge).
|= Ka(a kM)↔ a kM
28
Proof. The →-direction follows from the reflexivity of ≡a, and the ←-direction
from the definition of ≡a as state indistinguishability with respect to individual
knowledge.
The second law describes an important interaction between individual and
propositional knowledge by means of their respective languages M and L. For
the sake of stating the law succinctly, we recall the following standard definition.
Definition 7 (Language equivalence). Let L ⊆ L designate a sublanguage of
L. Then two pointed models (S,V), s and (S,V), s′ are L-equivalent, written
(S,V), s ≡L (S,V), s′, :iff for all φ ∈ L, (S,V), s |= φ iff (S,V), s′ |= φ. (The
relation ≡L is called elementary equivalence.)
The law says that state indistinguishability with respect to individual knowledge
equals state indistinguishability with respect to propositional knowledge.
Proposition 7 (Indistinguishability). Let a ∈ A and
Re := { a kM | M ∈M }
Dicto := { Ka(φ) | φ ∈ L }.
Then,
≡Re = ≡Dicto .
Proof. The ⊆-direction follows from the definition of ≡a as state indistinguisha-
bility with respect to individual knowledge, and the transitivity of ≡a; and
the ⊇-direction from the fact that for all M ∈ M, (a kM) ∈ L and Proposi-
tion 6.
The third law—to be used as a lemma for the fourth—describes an impor-
tant interaction between individual and propositional knowledge by means of
message signing. (It is an epistemic expansion of Theorem 2.20.) The law also
gives an example of interpreted communication: how to induce propositional
knowledge with a certain piece of individual knowledge (i.e., a signed message).
Proposition 8 (The purpose of signing).
|= a k {[M ]}b → Ka(b k {[M ]}b)
Proof. Let (S,V) designate an arbitrary LiP-model, and let s ∈ S, a, b ∈ A,
and M ∈ M. Further, suppose that (S,V), s |= a k {[M ]}b and let s′ ∈ S
such that s′ ≡a s. Hence, (S,V), s′ |= a k {[M ]}b by definition of ≡a as state
indistinguishability with respect to individual knowledge, and thus (S,V), s′ |=
b k {[M ]}b due to the unforgeability of signatures (only b can generate {[M ]}b).
The fourth law describes an important interaction between knowledge and
interactive proofs, again by means of message signing. The law also gives an
explication of the epistemic impact of signed interactive proofs.
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Theorem 4 (Proofs of Knowledge). Signed interactive proofs are peer-reviewable
proofs of knowledge14 in the following formal sense:
|= (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}b ( a kM ∧ Ka(φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
induced knowledge
).
Proof. We first prove the stronger fact that
|= (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ).
Let (S,V) designate an arbitrary LiP-model, and let s ∈ S, a ∈ A, C ⊆ A, b ∈
C ∪ {a}, and M ∈ M. Further, suppose that (S,V), s |= M :Ca φ, let sˇ ∈ S such
that s ≤C∪{a}∪{b} sˇ, and suppose that (S,V), sˇ |= b k {[M ]}a. Hence, (S,V), sˇ |=
Kb(a k {[M ]}a) by Proposition 8, and thus (S,V), sˇ |= Kb(a kM) by modus ponens
of |= Kb(a k {[M ]}a → a kM) (epistemic necessitation of signature analysis) and
|= Kb(a k {[M ]}a → a kM)→ (Kb(a k {[M ]}a)→ Kb(a kM)) (Kripke’s law). Now,
let s˜ ∈ S such that sˇ ≡b s˜. Thus, sˇ ≤C∪{a}∪{b} s˜, thus s ≤C∪{a}∪{b} s˜ by
transitivity, and thus s ≤C∪{a} s˜ by the hypothesis that b ∈ C ∪ {a}. Hence,
(S,V), s˜ |= M :Ca φ by peer persistency, (S,V), sˇ |= Kb(M :Ca φ) by discharge of
the last hypothesis, and thus (S,V), sˇ |= Kb(a kM ∧M :Ca φ).
Our theorem now follows from a stronger version of epistemic truthfulness,
that is, |= (M :Ca φ) → (a kM → Ka(φ)), which in turn follows from the expan-
sion of the truth condition of M :Ca φ.
The fifth law describes an important interaction between common knowledge
[FHMV95, MV07] and purported interactive proofs, namely their falsifiability
in a communal sense of Popper’s critical rationalism. More precisely, we refer
to Popper’s dictum that a hypothesis (here, that a purported interactive proof
is indeed a proof) should be falsifiable in the sense that if the hypothesis is
false then its falsehood should be cognisable (here, commonly knowable).
In the present paper, we restrict the relation between Popper’s œuvre and our
work to this succinct dictum. Recall from [FHMV95, MV07] that common
knowledge among a community C can be captured with a modality CKC defined
as
(S,V), s |= CKC(φ) :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s ≡C s′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ,
where ≡C := (
⋃
a∈C ≡a)∗. The intuition is that a statement φ is common
knowledge in a community C of agents when: all agents know that φ is true
(call this new statement φ′), all agents know that φ′ is true (call this new
statement φ′′), all agents know that φ′′ is true (call this new statement φ′′′),
etc. Note that depending on the properties of the employed communication
lines, common knowledge may have to be pre-established off those lines along
14This terminology is inspired by [Gol01, Page 262], where such proofs are defined as “[. . .]
proofs in which the prover [here a] asserts “knowledge” of some object [. . .] and not merely
its existence [. . .]” by means of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machines.
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other lines [HM90], which is also why there is no built-in common-knowledge
operator in LiP.
Theorem 5 (Falsifiability of interactive “proofs”). Interactive “proofs” are fal-
sifiable in a communal sense of Popper’s, that is, if a datum M ∈ M is not
a C ∪ {a}-reviewable proof of a statement φ ∈ L then this fact is communally
cognisable as such by C ∪{a} in terms of the common knowledge among C ∪{a}
of that fact. Formally,
|= (¬M :Ca φ)→ CKC∪{a}(¬M :Ca φ).
Proof. Let (S,V) designate an arbitrary LiP-model, and let s ∈ S, a ∈ A, C ⊆
A, and M ∈M. Further, suppose that (S,V), s |= ¬M :Ca φ, let s′ ∈ S such that
s ≡C∪{a} s′ (thus s′ ≤C∪{a} s), and suppose by contradiction that (S,V), s′ |=
M :Ca φ. Hence (S,V), s |= M :Ca φ by peer persistency—contradiction!
Note also the following simpler fact, which asserts that what is commonly ac-
cepted as proof constitutes common knowledge.
Fact 3 (Common proof knowledge).
|= (M :Ca φ)→ CKC∪{a}(M :Ca φ)
This however does not mean that M is known by everybody in C ∪ {a}!
2.4 Oracle-computational explication
As announced, our interactive proofs have also an oracle-computational explica-
tion in terms of a computation oracle that acts as a hypothetical provider and
thus as an imaginary epistemic source of our interactive proofs. To see this,
consider that the elementary definition of proof accessibility in Definition 3 can
be redefined (for the time being) such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MR
C
a s
′ :iff s′ ∈
⋃
s <MC∪{a} s˜ and
M ∈ cls˜a(∅)
[s˜]≡a (2)
for all M ∈M and C ⊆ A, <MC := (
⋃
a∈C
<Ma )
++
s <Ma s
′ :iff clsa({M}) = cls
′
a (∅),
where ‘++’ designates the closure operation of so-called generalised transitivity
in the sense that <MC ◦ <M
′
C ⊆ <(M,M
′)
C . Note that when s <
M
a s
′ for some
states s, s′ ∈ S, agent a can conceive of s′ as s yet minimally enriched with the
information token M , for which a could imagine invoking an oracle agent. In
other words, if a knew M (e.g., if a received M from the oracle) then a could
not distinguish s from s′ in the sense of ≡a. This hypothetical knowledge was
called adductive knowledge in [Kra08b]—from now on also oracle knowledge—
and implemented with a concrete message reception event for a that carries the
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information of M in s′. Now, similarly to Page 27, our above-redefined proof-
accessibility relation can be transformed and then used for redefining (again,
for the time being) the proof modality as follows:
(S,V), s |= M :Ca φ :iff
for all s′ ∈ S, if s <MC∪{a} s′ then (peer C ∪ {a} persistent)
(S,V), s′ |= a kM → Ka(φ) (epistemic impact).
The new notion of proof resulting from Accessibility Relation 2 is obviously
weaker than our original notion resulting from Accessibility Relation 1 on Page 23,
in the sense that the epistemic impact of Notion 1 is data persistent, e.g., is the
case even when more messages than just the proof are learnt, whereas the one
of Notion 2 is not necessarily so, that is, is the case possibly only at the instant
of learning the proof. (Still, both notions induce knowledge and not only be-
lief!) Therefore, we call interactive proofs in the sense of Notion 1 persistent or
extant and those in the sense of Notion 2 instant interactive proofs. For multi-
agent distributed systems, instant interactive proofs are interesting, e.g., for
accountability (cf. [KR10] and [KR11], both based on [Kra08b]). In accountable
multi-agent distributed systems, an agent may prove her correct past behaviour
in the present state to some judge, e.g., with a signed logfile [KR10], but may
well then cease behaving correctly in the future. Hence her correctness proof is
instant but may well not be persistent. The epistemic explication for Notion 2
is, spelled out:
An instant proof effectuates an instant epistemic impact in its in-
tended community of peer reviewers that consists in the induction of
the (propositional) knowledge of the proof goal by means of the (indi-
vidual) knowledge of the proof with the interpreting reviewer [Kra13].
Observe that our notion of knowledge induction (impact effectuation) for instant
interactive proofs is a parameterised instant implication, which is compatible
with D. Lewis relevant implication (cf. our corresponding discussion on Page 28).
That is, a kM → Ka(φ) is true at all states s′ closest to s with respect to ≤C∪{a},
that is, for which s <MC∪{a} s
′. The token M represents the minimal difference.
Of course, a may in fact know M in s; so the conditional is not necessarily
counter-factual.
Our above definitions can be related to our original ones as follows.
Proposition 9. For all s, s′ ∈ S:
1. s ≤a s′ if and only if there is M ∈M such that s <Ma s′
2. s ≤C s′ if and only if there is M ∈M such that s <MC s′
Proof. We prove the if-direction of (1)—the only-if-direction being obvious, and
(2) obviously following from (1). Let s, s′ ∈ S and suppose that s ≤a s′. Hence
there is a finite D ⊆ M such that clsa(D) = cls
′
a (∅), because msgsa(s) and
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msgsa(s
′) are finite (cf. Page 22). Hence there is M ∈M such that clsa({M}) =
clsa(D). (For example, choose M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) where D = {M1, . . . ,Mn}.)
Thus, clsa({M}) = cls
′
a (∅) by transitivity, and s <Ma s′ by definition.
Hence, Notion 1 can be recovered from Notion 2 by redefining the proof
accessibility on Page 23 such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MR
C
a s
′ :iff s′ ∈
⋃
s (
⋃
M′∈M <
M′
C∪{a}) sˇ
and M ∈ clsˇa(∅)
[sˇ]≡a , (3)
and thus Notion 3 and Notion 1 are equivalent.
Proposition 10. When the proof modality is interpreted with Notion 2,
|= a :∅a φ↔ Ka(φ).
Proof. By the fact that <a{a} = ≡a.
We leave the further study of instant interactive proofs for future work.
2.5 More results
Theorem 6 (Adequacy). `LiP is adequate for |=, that is:
1. if `LiP φ then |= φ (axiomatic soundness)
2. if |= φ then `LiP φ (semantic completeness).
Proof. Soundness follows from the admissibility of axioms and rules (cf. Propo-
sition 5), and completeness by means of the classical construction of canonical
models, using Lindenbaum’s construction of maximally consistent sets (cf. Ap-
pendix A).
We leave the study of strong adequacy [Fit07, Section 3] for future work.
Corollary 3 (Consistency).
1. If `LiP φ then 6`LiP ¬φ.
2. 6`LiP ⊥
Proof. As usual: suppose that `LiP φ. Hence |= φ by semantic completeness.
Hence 6|= ¬φ by the definition of |= . Hence 6`LiP ¬φ by contraposition of ax-
iomatic soundness; and (2) follows jointly from the instance of (1) where φ := >,
the axiom `LiP a k a, and the macro-definitions of > as a k a and ⊥ as ¬>.
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Corollary 4 (Stateful proof equality). Let (S,V) designate an arbitrary LiP-
model, and let s ∈ S, M ∈M, a ∈ A, C ⊆ A, and φ ∈ L. Further let:
sJMKCa := { φ | (S,V), s |= M :Ca φ } (message meaning)
s≡Ca := { (M,M ′) ∈M×M | sJMKCa = sJM ′KCa }
0 := [a]
s≡Ca
[M ]
s≡Ca + [M
′]
s≡Ca := [(M,M
′)]
s≡Ca .
Then,
〈M/
s≡Ca , 0,+〉
is an idempotent commutative monoid, that is, for all M ,M ′,M ′′ ∈M/
s≡Ca :
1. M + (M ′ +M ′′) = (M +M ′) +M ′′ (associativity)
2. M +M ′ =M ′ +M (commutativity)
3. M +M =M (idempotency)
4. M + 0 =M (neutral element).
Proof. By the soundness of proof associativity, commutativity, and idempo-
tency, and the law of a self-neutral proof element, respectively (cf. Theorem 1).
Theorem 7 (Finite-model property). For any LiP-model M, if M, s |= φ then
there is a finite LiP-model Mfin such that Mfin, s |= φ.
Proof. By the fact that the minimal filtration [GO07]
Mmin,Γflt := (S/∼Γ , {(MRCa)min,Γ}M∈M,a∈A,C⊆A,VΓ)
of any LiP-model M := (S, {MRCa}M∈M,a∈A,C⊆A,V) through a finite Γ ⊆ L is a
finite LiP-model such that for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ if and only if Mmin,Γflt , [s]∼Γ |=
γ. Following [GO07] for our setting, we define
∼Γ := { (s, s′) ∈ S × S | for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ iff M, s′ |= γ }
(MRCa)min,Γ := { ([s]∼Γ , [s′]∼Γ) | (s, s′) ∈ MRCa }
VΓ(P ) := { [s]∼Γ | s ∈ V(P ) } .
We further fix M ∈ cl[s]∼Γa (∅) as [s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM) and choose Γ to be the
(finite) sub-formula closure of φ. Hence, we are left to prove that Mmin,Γflt is
indeed an LiP-model, which means that we are left to prove that (MRCa)min,Γ
has all the properties of MRCa . Simply apply definitions back and forth.
Corollary 5 (Algorithmic decidability). LiP is algorithmically decidable.
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Proof. In order to algorithmically decide whether or not φ ∈ LiP (that is, `LiP
φ) for some φ ∈ L (and the current choice of M), axiomatic adequacy allows
us to check whether or not ¬φ is locally satisfiable (That is, whether or not
M, s |= ¬φ for some LiP-model M and state s. Also, M ∈ clsa(∅) on the
currently chosen message language M is obviously decidable; for other, more
complex message languages including cryptographic messages, see for example
[TGD10] and [BRS10]). But then, the finite-model property of LiP allows us to
enumerate all finite LiP-modelsMfin up to a size of at most 2 to the power of the
size n of the sub-formula closure of ¬φ and to check whether or notMfin, s |= ¬φ.
(First, there are at most 2n equivalence classes for n formulas. Second, checking
classical negation within a finite model is also a finite task.)
Note that the algorithmic complexity of LiP will depend on the specific
choice of M and the correspondingly chosen term axioms.
3 Interactive programs from interactive proofs
In this section, we present the remaining interactive formalisms mentioned in
Figure 1, namely: (1) an interactive multi-agent S4-modal logic (iS4), (2) inter-
active Intuitionistic Logic (iIL), and (3) (typed) interactive Combinatory Logic
(TiCL) providing (typed) interactive programs as agent-specific combinators.
3.1 Interactive S4 (iS4)
An interactive multi-agent classical normal S4-modal logic (iS4) can be obtained
as a fragment of LiP with epistemically guarded quantifiers over term variables
(egFOLiP) by interpreting the iS4-necessity modality as the existence of the
individual knowledge of an interactive proof in the sense of LiP.
We define iS4 and its necessity modality by the following seven laws
• for all axioms φ of classical propositional logic, `iS4 φ
• `iS4 Ca(φ→ φ′)→ (Ca(φ)→ Ca(φ′)) (K)
• `iS4 Ca(φ)→ Ca(Ca(φ)) (4)
• `iS4 Ca(φ)→ φ (T)
• `iS4 C∪C′a (φ)→ Ca(φ) (group decomposition)
• {φ} `iS4 Ca(φ) (N)
• {φ, φ→ φ′} `iS4 φ (modus ponens)
and its egFOLiP-interpretation map as
Ca(φ) 7→ ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ) (epistemic provability)
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(S4- and iS4-syntax are identical modulo iS4-modality parameters a and C.)
The corresponding iS4-possibility modality can then be macro-defined as usual
and interpreted in egFOLiP accordingly:
♦Ca(φ) := ¬Ca(¬φ)
7→ ¬∃m(a km ∧m :Ca ¬φ)
↔ ∀m(a km→ ¬(m :Ca ¬φ))
:= ∀m(a km→M Ca φ)
The following proposition asserts that our egFOLiP-interpretation of our Ca-
modality is adequate in the sense of satisfying all the required modal laws.
Proposition 11. The following iS4-interpretations are valid egFOLiP-laws:
1. ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ (∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ)→ ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ′))
2. ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ)→ ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca (∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ)))
3. ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ)→ φ
4. ∃m(a km ∧m :C∪C′a φ)→ ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ)
5. if φ is valid in egFOLiP then ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ) is valid in egFOLiP
Proof. We reason rigorously but only semi-formally, as we have not explicitly
stipulated all axioms for egFOLiP, by appealing only to obviously valid princi-
ples. These principles are the LiP-laws as well as usual FOL-laws. No special
first-order modal laws or models [BG07] are required for the proof.
For (1), suppose that ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca (φ → φ′)) is locally true, that is, at
an arbitrary location. Thus there is M ∈M such that a kM ∧M :Ca (φ→ φ′) is
true at the same location. Further suppose that ∃m(a km∧m :Ca φ) is true there
too. Thus there is M ′ ∈ M such that a kM ′ ∧M ′ :Ca φ is true there. Hence,
a k (M,M ′)∧ (M,M ′) :Ca φ′ is true there, by message pairing and the generalised
Kripke-law, respectively. In conclusion, ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ′) is locally true.
For (2), suppose that ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ) is locally true. Thus there is M ∈
M such that a kM ∧M :Ca φ is true at the same location. Hence, a k {[M ]}a ∧
{[M ]}a :Ca (a kM ∧ M :Ca φ) is true there too, by signature synthesis as well as
authentic knowledge and peer review, respectively. Thus there is M ′ ∈M such
that a kM ′ ∧M ′ :Ca (a kM ∧M :Ca φ) is true there. In conclusion, ∃m(a km ∧
m :Ca (∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ))) is locally true.
For (3), suppose that ∃m(a km∧m :Ca φ) is locally true. Thus there is M ∈M
such that a kM ∧M :Ca φ is true at the same location. Hence and in conclusion,
φ is true there too, by epistemic truthfulness.
For (4), suppose that ∃m(a km∧m :C∪C′a φ) is locally true. Thus there is M ∈
M such that a kM∧M :C∪C′a φ is true at the same location. Hence, a kM∧M :Ca φ
is true there too, by group decomposition. In conclusion, ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ) is
locally true.
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For (5), suppose that φ is valid in egFOLiP. Hence, a :Ca φ is valid in egFOLiP,
by self-truthfulness bis. On the other hand, a k a (knowledge of one’s own name
string) is valid in egFOLiP too. Hence a k a ∧ a :Ca φ is valid in egFOLiP. In
conclusion, ∃m(a km ∧m :Ca φ) is valid in egFOLiP.
Note that the stronger principle
“ for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, `iS4 Ca(φ)→ C∪{a}b (Ca(φ)) ”
cannot be valid due to a knowing M not necessarily implying that b know {[M ]}a
(at the same location), at least not without a communicating {[M ]}a to b (and
thus possibly inducing a successor and thus different location), as the reader can
verify herself by trying (but necessarily failing) to prove this stronger principle.
Further note that a more general interactive provability modality interpreted as
C(a,b)(φ) 7→ ∃m(a km ∧m :Cb φ)
cannot satisfy the T-law, thus is not S4, and thus does not embed (i)IL.
In summary, the multi-agency and thus interactivity of iS4 cannot be strong,
which is a strong argument for stronger, more explicit modalities than those of
iS4 in the sense of modalities with an added proof parameter, like those of LiP.
Even less strong in this sense must be interactive Intuitionistic Logic (iIL).
3.2 Interactive Intuitionistic Logic (iIL)
As demonstrated in [Kra15, Remark 2.8], the interactive intuitionistic truths are
the truths of the communication medium, the adversarial agent par excellence,
and only of that. No other agent can access the same interactive truths. This is
so, because only the communication medium has a view of the communication
network, thus also of itself, that is sufficiently global to induce the necessary and
sufficient partial order (rather than only an insufficient preorder) for a Kripke-
semantics of interactive Intuitionistic Logic (iIL), the non-modal intuitionistic
fragment of the intuitionistic modal Logic of intuitionistic interactive Proofs
(LIiP) [Kra15, Remark 2.12]. Recall that Intuitionistic Logic (IL) can only be
defined by means of a Kripke-semantics that does require a partial order.
In other words, iIL is isomorphic to IL.
Fact 4. iIL ∼= IL
Thus all connectives of IL can be viewed as pertaining to the communication
medium, the adversary, and only to that.
Hence, iIL embeds into iS4 like IL does into S4 a` la Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski,
by prefixing intuitionistic subformulas with an S4-necessity modality like Ca .
In the other direction, iS4 embeds into iIL like S4 does into IL a` la [Fer06].
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3.3 Typed interactive Combinatory Logic (TiCL)
In order to define typed interactive Combinatory Logic (TiCL), we first need
to define untyped interactive Combinatory Logic (iCL), just as with typed and
untyped non-interactive Combinatory Logic (TCL and CL, respectively) [HS08].
Definition 8 (Interactive Combinatory Logic (iCL)). Let X designate a count-
ably infinite set of (term) variables x. Then,
T 3 T ::= x ∣∣ Ka ∣∣ Sa ∣∣ (T, T )
shall designate the language of (pure) interactive combinatory terms (iCL-terms)
T with basic combinators Ka and Sa for all a ∈ A, and a−→ ⊆ T × T such that
• ((Ka, T ), T ′) a−→ T
• (((Sa, T ), T ′), T ′′) a−→ ((T, T ′′), (T ′, T ′′))
• if T a−→ T ′ then (T, T ′′) a−→ (T ′, T ′′) and (T ′′, T ) a−→ (T ′′, T ′)
shall designate (local) reduction at agent a on iCL-terms.
Further let α ∈ A∗ ∪ Aω designate a finite or infinite word over A with
 ∈ A∗ the empty word. Then, α−→ ⊆ T × T such that
−→ := ∅
a·α′−−−→ := a−→ ◦ α
′
−→
shall designate reduction (tout court) on iCL-terms.
A (finite or an infinite) reduction T
α−→ T ′ such that α ∈ C∗ ∪ Cω for some
∅ 6= C ⊆ A shall be called a local, single-agent, or non-interactive computation
when |C| = 1, and a global or multi-agent—and only possibly but not necessarily
an interactive (cf. Definition 9)—computation when |C| > 1.
iCL-combinators are defined to be variable-free iCL-terms.
The reason for our introduction of explicit parentheses (pairing) in iCL-syntax is
the resulting possibility of interactive combinators to be messages (mobile code).
Further, like for CL, applied variants of iCL can be obtained by including other
terms, such as agent names and others, into the language of pure iCL.
In fact, each agent has her own local copy of CL bearing her name. More
precisely, the agent with name a is, or is identified with, the relation
a−→ and
thus indirectly a Turing-machine labelled a. Hence each such copy, and thus
iCL as a whole (containing all those CL-copies), is Turing-powerful, as CL is.
Fact 5. iCL is at least Turing-powerful.
Further like CL, iCL has the important Church-Rosser Property.
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Theorem 8 (Church-Rosser Property of iCL). Reduction on iCL-terms is con-
fluent (at most finitely diverging): for all T, T1, T2 ∈ T and α1, α2 ∈ A∗,
if T
α1−→ T1 and T α2−→ T2 then
there are T ′ ∈ T and α′1, α′2 ∈ A∗ such that
T1
α′1−→ T ′ and T2 α
′
2−→ T ′.
Proof. See Appendix 8.
Based on iCL, an interactive (agent-centric) lambda-operator can be defined.
Definition 9 (The interactive lambda-operator). Let a ∈ A, x ∈ X , and T ∈ T .
Then in analogy with [HS08], we define λax.T , the interactive lambda-operator
in x for a and with scope T , inductively on the structure of iCL-terms such that:
λax.T := (Ka, T ) if x does not occur in T
λax.x := ((Sa, Ka), Ka) (a’s identity combinator)
λax.(T, x) := T if x does not occur in T
λax.(T, T
′) := ((Sa, λax.T ), λax.T ′) if x occurs in (T, T ′)
For a 6= b, a macro λax.T with another macro λby.T ′ occurring in T and x
occurring in T ′ shall be called a communication channel from agent a to agent b
and its reduction an interactive and thus a global and multi-agent computation.
(Interactivity implies multi-agency, but not necessarily vice versa, because mul-
tiple agents can compute locally for themselves, without communicating with
each other.) For example, the macro λax.λby.(y, x) for the interactive program
of a being able to send a message (through her port) x to b and thus b being
able to receive x through her port y, expanding to λax.((Sb, λby.y), λby.x)), in
turn expanding to λax.((Sb, ((Sb, Kb), Kb)), (Kb, x))), etc., is such a channel. From
this, it should be obvious that our interactive lambda-operator is useful syntac-
tic sugar for the agent- and channel-oriented programming of communication
protocols. Of course, we could extend our definition of reduction to iCL-terms
with lambda-operators, and define each communication reduction to generate a
concrete input-history event in the sense of Definition 3.
Note that due to its Turing-powerful interactivity, iCL can be appreciated as
a bound-variable free, grammatically much simpler alternative to the popular
Pi-calculus [Mil99] and its derivatives (including its applied variants).
We postpone the further independent study of iCL to future work and con-
tinue to present the connection of iCL to iIL and LiP via TiCL.
Definition 10 (Typed iCL (TiCL)). Let P designate a set of type variables
(for example the set of propositional variables in Definition 1). Then, P ∈ P
designates a type and if ϕ and ϕ′ designate types then so does ϕ→ ϕ′, and
• Γ ∪ {x : ϕ} `TiCL x : ϕ
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• Γ `TiCL Ka : (ϕ→ (ϕ′ → ϕ)) (a ∈ A)
• Γ `TiCL Sa : ((ϕ→ (ϕ′ → ϕ′′))→ ((ϕ→ ϕ′)→ (ϕ→ ϕ′′))) (a ∈ A)
• if Γ `TiCL T : (ϕ→ ϕ′) and Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ then Γ `TiCL (T, T ′) : ϕ′
shall designate Typed iCL (TiCL).
TiCL is defined in Curry’s style of typing, where type formulas label proof terms,
which is more general than Church’s style, where type formulas are parts of the
proof terms themselves. For more details on these two typing styles, see [HS08].
Theorem 9 (Termination and Type Invariance of TiCL). In TiCL, all compu-
tations local or global are finite (terminating), and preserve their typing (types
are computational invariants, that is, they are invariant under reduction):
for all T, T ′ ∈ T ,
if T
α−→ T ′ and Γ `TiCL T : ϕ then α ∈ A∗ and Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ.
Proof. See Appendix 9.
As usual, the termination of computations (executing programs) corresponds
to the totality of the corresponding computed functions. That types are com-
putational invariants is natural, because (1) types are intuitionistic formulas,
which are (forward) invariant under computations (see for example [Kra15]),
and (2) types and interactive programs are interconnected via the following
Curry-Howard isomorphism (formulation adapted from [SU06]).
Proposition 12 (Interactive Curry-Howard Isomorphism). Let N ( N. Then,
1. if {xi : ϕi}i∈N `TiCL T : ϕ then {ϕi}i∈N `iIL ϕ , and
2. if {ϕi}i∈N `iIL ϕ then there is T ∈ T such that {xi : ϕi}i∈N `TiCL T : ϕ .
Proof. Immediate: for (1) by induction on the derivation of {xi : ϕi}i∈N `TiCL
T : ϕ, and for (2) by induction on the derivation of {ϕi}i∈N `iIL ϕ. Just inspect
the (corresponding) axioms and definitions of (i)IL and TiCL, respectively.
The following proposition asserts that the modal logic LiP can be viewed as
including the type system that is categorical TiCL, where categorical15 TiCL
is TiCL without variables. Of course, adding variables to LiP would be trivial,
and so LiP with variables could be viewed as including (full) TiCL!
Proposition 13 (LiP as including categorical TiCL). For all a, b ∈ A :
1. `LiP Kb :Ca (φ→ (φ′ → φ))
2. `LiP Sb :Ca ((φ→ (φ′ → φ′′))→ ((φ→ φ′)→ (φ→ φ′′)))
15For more details on categoricity, see for example [dQdOG12].
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3. {M :Ca (φ→ φ′),M ′ :Ca φ} `LiP (M,M ′) :Ca φ′
Proof. (1) and (2) hold by necessitation (N), and (3) by the generalised Kripke-
law (GK).
Note however that the converse view “categorical TiCL as including LiP” is
incorrect. Categorical TiCL can only be viewed as a proper fragment of LiP,
since type systems can only talk about atomic type statements. (Type systems
have no logical connectives that could form compound type statements.) So,
modal logics of combinators like LiP are more general than simple-type systems.
Theorem 10 (Fundamental Isomorphism of Interactive Computation).
TiCL ∼= TCL
Proof. By the isomorphisms TiCL ∼= iIL (Proposition 12), iIL ∼= IL (Fact 4),
and IL ∼= TCL (Curry-Howard), and the transitivity property of isomorphy.
The simple typing of iCL can of course be extended to more complex and thus
powerful typings, like the simple typing of CL has been. Thus the question of
whether or not interactive computation is strictly more powerful (recall Fact 5)
than non-interactive computation [GSW06] may well be settled in stages of
typings capturing levels of gradually increasing computational strength.
Corollary 6 (Equipotency of Simply-Typed Interactivity and Non-Interactiv-
ity). Interactive and non-interactive computation are equipotent at the level of
simple types (as defined by TiCL and TCL, respectively), and capture the so-
called extended polynomial functions over the natural numbers [HS08, Sch76].
Proof. By Theorem 10 and [Sch76], respectively.
This result as well as the strategy of settling computability and complexity
questions by type stages could have a profound impact on communication com-
plexity and distributed (and thus concurrent and parallel) computation research.
Ultimately, they enable a comparative approach to the Church-Turing Thesis.
4 Related work
In this section, we relate our Logic of interactive Proofs (LiP) to Arte¨mov’s Logic
of Proofs (LP) [Art94] and to a generalised variant thereof, namely his Symmet-
ric Logic of Proofs (SLP) [Art08b]. We also relate LiP to two extensions of LP
with multi-agent character, namely Yavorskaya’s LP2 [Yav08] and Renne’s UL
[Ren12]. The general aim of this section is to give a detailed description of cru-
cial design decisions for interactive and non-interactive systems on the example
of related works. Essentially, we argue that, first, LP and LiP can be related
but have typically different (not always) but complementary scopes, namely
non-interactive computation and universal truths, and interactive computation
and local truths, respectively; and, second, LiP improves LP-like systems with
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respect to interactivity. That LP and LiP can indeed be related is evidenced
to some extent by Theorem 11 and proved by the example following it, which
happens to be formalisable in both LP and LiP. That we discuss multi-agent
extensions of LP is justified by the fact that LP2 and UL are intended to be
interactive but inherit the lack of message-passing interactivity from LP. As a
matter of fact, the example with signing is formalisable only in LiP.
4.1 Concepts
In (S)LP, p:F stands for an atomic concept. Whereas in LiP, M :Ca φ stands
for a compound concept analysable into epistemic constituents (cf. Section 2.3),
nota bene thanks to a constructive semantics defined in terms of the proof
terms themselves (cf. Page 23). In that, our construction is reminiscent of the
canonical-model construction, which like ours is a constructive semantics defined
in terms of syntax, but unlike ours not in terms of terms but in terms of formulas
(cf. Appendix A).
4.1.1 Interactivity
(S)LP proofs are non-interactive, whereas LiP proofs are interactive (knowledge-
inducing). (S)LP proofs are non-interactive also due to (S)LP’s reflection axiom,
which stipulates that provability imply truth16. However, in a truly interactive
setting, (S)LP’s reflection axiom is unsound. By a truly interactive setting,
we mean a multi-agent distributed system where not all proofs are known by
all agents, that is, a setting with a non-trivial distribution of information in
the sense of Scott (cf. Proposition 3), in which 6|= a kM . In other words, in
truly interactive settings, agents are not omniscient with respect to messages.
Otherwise, why communicate? As proof, consider the following, self-referential
counter-example: |= M :∅a (a kM) (self-knowledge) but 6|= M :∅a (a kM)→ a kM .
In truly interactive settings, there being a proof does not imply knowledge of
that proof. When an agent a does not know the proof and the agent cannot
generate the proof ex nihilo herself by guessing it, only communication from a
peer, who thus acts as an oracle, can entail the knowledge of the proof with
a. In sum, provability and truth are necessarily concomitant in the
non-interactive setting, whereas in interactive settings they are not
necessarily so.
4.1.2 Proof terms
(S)LP needs three proof-term constructors, namely sum, application, and proof
checker. Whereas LiP only needs two, namely pairing and signing, but as op-
posed to LP can even handle interaction (with signing). Incidentally, Go¨del
conjectured that two proof-term constructors were sufficient for proofs [Art01].
In LiP, pairing plays a pair of roles, namely the two roles played by sum and
application in LP, and thanks to Fact 3 the agents themselves within their own
16(S)LP (and LiP) has a semantics, so we may use the word ‘truth’ here.
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communities may—not a term constructor like ‘!’ in (S)LP must—play the
proof-checker role! In sum, first, LiP-agents play a pair of roles, namely the
two roles of proof as well as signature checker, and, second, signatures can be
conceived as proof-checker-apposed, communally verifiable seals of check.
4.1.3 Formulas
(S)LP’s proof modality ‘:’ has no parameters, whereas LiP’s ‘ :Ca ’ has two. The
advantage of LiP’s parametric modality is agent-centricity and thus greater
generality. As a nice side effect, LiP’s proof terms have neutral elements.
4.2 Laws
4.2.1 Structural laws (cf. Theorem 1)
In LP, the proof-sum operation ‘+’ is neither commutative nor idempotent,
but in SLP, it is both, like ‘(·, ·)’ in LiP. In (S)LP, ‘+’ has no neutral element,
whereas in LiP the corresponding ‘(·, ·)’ has. As said previously, LiP’s ‘(·, ·)’ can
simulate not only LP’s proof sum but also (S)LP’s proof application. However,
LiP’s ‘(·, ·)’ cannot simulate SLP’s sum. To see why, consider that if (S)LP were
defined analogously to LiP by means of a separate term theory using atomic
propositions ‘k p’ (for “p is known”) and an analog of epistemic antitonicity
then the structural modal laws of (S)LP could be (partially) generated from the
structural term laws, analogously to LiP.
LP From the term axiom schema
k p+q → (k p ∧ k q)
generate the corresponding characteristic law
((p:F ) ∨ q:F )→ (p+q):F.
SLP
1. From the term axiom schema
k p+q → (k p ∧ k q)
generate the corresponding characteristic law
((p:F ) ∨ q:F )→ (p+q):F.
2. Add the axiom schema
((p+q):F )→ ((p:F ) ∨ q:F ),
and (disregarding SLP’s proof application) obtain the characteristic law
((p:F ) ∨ q:F )↔ (p+q):F
of SLP’s sum, which subsumes LP’s sum law.
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Table 2: Interesting truths
Computation Truth
interactive local
non-interactive universal
However in the case of LiP,
6|= ((M,M ′) :Ca φ)→ ((M :Ca φ) ∨M ′ :Ca φ),
due to the obvious counter-example (recall that |= (M,M ′) :∅a a k (M,M ′))
6|= ((M,M ′) :∅a a k (M,M ′))→ ((M :∅a a k (M,M ′)) ∨M ′ :∅a a k (M,M ′)).
That is, it is not generally true that single projections prove pair knowledge.
4.2.2 Logical laws (cf. Theorem 2)
(S)LP does not obey Kripke’s law K, the law of necessitation, nor a law of modal
idempotency. Whereas LiP does obey K as well as the generalised Kripke-law
GK, necessitation, and the law of modal idempotency.
Note that for resource-bounded agents, restricting the (resource-unbounded)
pairing axiom would be desirable in order to prevent the (resource-unbounded)
K from being deducible in LiP. Incidentally, (S)LP can be understood as being
reconstructed only from the (resource-bounded) unpairing axiom and not from
the (resource-unbounded) pairing axiom (cf. Section 4.2.1).
The justification for choosing (plain) necessitation instead of LP’s constant
specification for LiP is that in the interactive setting, validities, and thus a for-
tiori tautologies (in the strict sense of validities of the propositional fragment),
are in some sense trivialities. To see why, recall from Definition 5 that validities
are true in all pointed models, and thus not worth being communicated from
one point to another in a given model, e.g., by means of specific interactive
proofs. (Nothing is logically more embarrassing than talking in tautologies.)
Therefore, validities deserve arbitrary messages as proof. What is worth being
communicated are truths weaker than validities, namely local truths in the sense
of Definition 5, which do not hold universally (cf. Table 2). Note that our choice
is not forced but free: we could have chosen constant specification for LiP too
(e.g., “`LiP a :Ca φ, for φ ∈ Γ1”) and thus kept a closer relationship between LP
and LiP, but that would have, first, put unnecessarily strong proof obligations
on validities as far as interactivity is concerned, as explained; and, second, un-
faithfully modelled resource-unbounded interacting agents, which already know
all universal truths or validities, though of course not all local truths, which is
the whole point of interacting with each other! In sum, while LP weakens neces-
sitation, LiP weakens truthfulness (without risking falsehood) by conditioning
it on proof knowledge (cf. Section 4.1.1).
(S)LP does not obey the law of modal idempotency, because it does not
have agents that could act as proof checkers and thus needs a term constructor
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for proof-checking. Whereas LiP does obey modal idempotency, because LiP
does have agents that can act as proof checkers (cf. Section 4.1.2) and thus
does not need a term constructor for proof-checking. Observe that modal idem-
potency is deducible in LiP due to the law of self-signing elimination, which
in turn is deducible in LiP due to the axiom of personal signature synthesis
(cf. Section B.2). Note that for resource-bounded agents, restricting (resource-
unbounded) personal signature synthesis could be desirable in order to prevent
(resource-unbounded) modal idempotency from being deducible in LiP. Inci-
dentally, (S)LP can be understood as being reconstructed from no term axioms
involving the proof checker ‘!’ (cf. Section 4.2.1).
4.2.3 Meta-logical properties
(S)LP is not a normal modal logic, because (S)LP does not obey Kripke’s law.
Whereas LiP is a normal logic (cf. Fact 1). LP is in Σp2 [Kuz00], but the decid-
ability and thus complexity of SLP is unknown [Art08b]. A lower complexity
bound for LiP is EXPTIME, which follows from the complexity of the logic of
common knowledge, which is EXPTIMEcomplete [HM92], and from the fact
that the concrete accessibility relation MR
C
a for LiP requires ≤C∪{a}, which con-
tains the one for common knowledge ≡C∪{a} (cf. Page 30). As mentioned at the
end of Section 2.5, complexity and decidability depend on term axioms.
4.3 Formal relation
In order to establish a formal relation between LP and LiP, we consider LiP
over a singleton society and over the term forms suggested on Page 13. So
without loss of generality let A = {a} and M\ {Ka, Sa}. Further, fix LP’s set
of specification constants to consist of {a}, and consider the mapping h over
LP-formulas that maps LP’s
• proof-sum ‘+’ and proof-application ‘·’ to LiP’s proof-pair constructor
‘(·, ·)’
• proof checker ‘!’ to LiP’s proof-signature constructor ‘{[·]}a’
• proof modality ‘:’ to LiP’s proof modality ‘ :∅a ’.
Lemma 1 (Admissibility of LP-laws for LiP). When A = {a} :
0. `LiP ϕ, for any axiom ϕ of classical propositional logic
1. `LiP ((M :∅a φ) ∨M ′ :∅a φ)→ (M,M ′) :∅a φ
2. `LiP (M :∅a (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ′ :∅a φ)→ (M,M ′) :∅a φ′)
3. `LiP (M :∅a φ)→ φ
4. `LiP (M :∅a φ)→ {[M ]}a :∅a (M :∅a φ)
5. {φ→ φ′, φ′} `LiP φ′
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6. `LiP a :∅a φ, for any formula φ for which `LiP φ in Item 0–4.
Proof. (0) holds by definition of LiP. For the rest, set C = ∅. Then (1) is LiP’s
law of proof extension (cf. Theorem 1.11); (2) is LiP’s generalised Kripke-law;
(3) is, given that A = {a} and M \ {Ka, Sa}, LiP’s law of truthfulness (cf.
Theorem 2.28.a); (4) is LiP’s laws of peer review; (5) holds by definition of LiP;
and (6) follows by particularising LiP-necessitation.
Theorem 11 (Homomorphism from LP into LiP). For A a singleton, for all
LP-formulas F ,
if `LP F then `LiP h(F ).
Proof. By the admissibility of LP-axioms and -rules for LiP (cf. Lemma 1).
However the converse is not true, and thus h is only a homomorphism and not
an embedding. As counter example consider Kripke’s law, which holds in LiP,
but does not hold in LP (cf. Section 4.2.2). In sum, while plain propositional
logic can be viewed as a modal logic interpreted over a singleton universe, LP
can be viewed only to a limited extent as LiP over a singleton society. The
extent is limited because LiP does not mathematically contain LP, as LP does
not embed (injectively homomorph) but only non-injectively homomorph into
LiP, which we believe reflects the essential difference between their scopes. We
stress that LP and LiP have typically different, complementary scopes, namely
non-interactive computation and universal truths, and interactive computation
and local truths, respectively. Nevertheless:
1. LP and LiP have a non-empty intersection, as the following example
proves, which happens to be formalisable in both LP [Art08a] and LiP,
which is also why we have chosen it (comparative explanatory power).
2. LiP is richer than S4, since LiP generalises S4 with agent centricity and
refines S4 with explicit, transmittable proofs.
The example involves two elementary formal proofs, which for clarity we present
in the style of Frederic Fitch, justified by the following definition and facts. So
its purpose is not mathematical (to reason about) but elementary (to use) logic.
The example makes all things used as explicit and thus as formal as possible.
So the mathematical (meta-)logician may want to simply skip it.
Definition 11 (Local hypotheses). Let Λ ( L such that Λ is finite, and
Γ; Λ `LiP φ :iff Γ `LiP (
∧
Λ)→ φ
(cf. Proposition 1), where Λ is understood as a finite set of local hypotheses.
Fact 6 (A fortiori true, persistently provable and known as true).
Γ, φ; Λ `LiP φ ∧ (M :Ca φ) ∧ a :∅a φ,
where Γ, φ means Γ ∪ {φ}.
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Proof. From Proposition 1 by the fact that `LiP φ implies `LiP φ, necessitation,
and self-truthfulness bis for the above case φ, M :Ca φ, and a :
∅
a φ, respectively.
Recall from Section 2.3, that `LiP a :∅a φ can be read as “a persistently knows
that φ is true” (unless interpreted defeasibly, cf. Proposition 10).
Fact 7 (Fitting-style deduction “theorems” [Fit07]).
LDT
Γ; Λ, φ `LiP φ′
Γ; Λ `LiP φ→ φ′
MP
Γ; Λ, φ `LiP φ′
Γ, φ; Λ `LiP φ′
Here, “LDT” abbreviates “Local Deduction Theorem”, “MP” abbreviates “ modus
ponens”, Λ, φ means Λ∪ {φ}, the double horizontal bar means “if and only if”,
and the simple horizontal bar reads “if . . . then . . . ” from top to bottom.
Proof. The validity of the LDT rule schema is warranted by Definition 11, and
the one of the MP rule schema by the modus ponens rule schema of LiP.
Following [Art08a], we now present the more difficult Case I of Gettier’s Case
I and II, which according to [Art08a] “were supposed to provide examples of
justified true beliefs which should not be considered knowledge.”
Example (Gettier, from [Art08a]). Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied
for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following
conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones
has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will
get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith sees the
entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he
has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e)
is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones,
will get the job. And also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his
pocket. Then, all of the following are true: 1) (e) is true, 2) Smith believes that
(e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true.
Interpreting “strong evidence” in Gettier’s example as “proof” in our sense,
Gettier’s Case I can be formalised in LiP as follows. Let:
• a ∈ A := {Smith, Jones};
• for all a ∈ A, job(a), 10(a) ∈ P.
Then Gettier’s assumptions stated in his example are contradictory, as asserted
by Proposition 14 and proved by jointly Lemma 2 and the proof in Table 3.
Lemma 2 corresponds to the assertion that (d) entails (e) in Gettier’s example.
Lemma 2 (Gettier example).
{(job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥}; ∅ `LiP
(job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))→ ∧a∈A(job(a)→ 10(a))
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Proof.
1. `LiP (job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥ global hypothesis
2. (a) job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones) local hypothesis
(b) job(Jones)→ 10(Jones) 2.a, PL
(c) (job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥ 1, a fortiori
(d) ¬job(Smith) 2.a, 2.c, PL
(e) job(Smith)→ 10(Smith) 2.d, PL
(f) (job(Jones)→ 10(Jones)) ∧ (job(Smith)→ 10(Smith))︸ ︷︷ ︸
the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket
2.b, 2.e, PL
3. `LiP (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))→
∧
a∈A(job(a)→ 10(a)) 2.a–2.f, LDT
4. if `LiP (job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥ 1–3, PL
then `LiP (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))→
∧
a∈A(job(a)→ 10(a))
5. {(job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥}; ∅ `LiP
(job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))→ ∧a∈A(job(a)→ 10(a)) 4, definition.
Proposition 14 (Gettier example).
{(job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥}; ∅ `LiP
(Smith kM ∧M :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones)))→
((job(Smith) ∧ 10(Smith))→ ⊥)
Proof. See Table 3.
In order to illustrate the working of signatures and the application of the
other logical laws of LiP, we now refine Gettier’s example with signing. That is,
we identify the proofM in Proposition 14 with a term pair (C, {[W ]}HR) consisting
of, first, a proof C for the fact 10(Jones) and, second, a work contract {[W ]}HR
for Jones signed by the HR department dealing with the job application.
Lemma 3 (Gettier-example with signing). Given A := {Smith, Jones, HR},
`LiP
(
Smith k {[W ]}HR ∧W :AHR job(Jones)
∧ Smith kC ∧ C :∅Smith 10(Jones)
)
→(
Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
)
Proof.
1. Smith k {[W ]}HR local hypothesis
2. W :AHR job(Jones) local hypothesis
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3. (W :AHR job(Jones))→ {[W ]}HR :ASmith job(Jones) simple peer review
4. {[W ]}HR :ASmith job(Jones) 2, 3, PL
5. ({[W ]}HR :ASmith job(Jones))→ {[W ]}HR :∅Smith job(Jones) group decomp.
6. {[W ]}HR :∅Smith job(Jones) 4, 5, PL
7. Smith kC local hypothesis
8. C :∅Smith 10(Jones) local hypothesis
9. (C :∅Smith 10(Jones))→ (C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith 10(Jones) proof ext.
10. (C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith 10(Jones) 8, 9, PL
11. Smith k {[W ]}HR 1, a fortiori
12. Smith kC 7, a fortiori
13. Smith kC ∧ Smith k {[W ]}HR 11, 12, PL
14. Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) 13, pairing
15. {[W ]}HR :∅Smith job(Jones) 6, a fortiori
16. ({[W ]}HR :∅Smith job(Jones))→ (C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith job(Jones) p. ext.
17. (C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith job(Jones) 15, 16, PL
18. (C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones)) 10, 17, proof conj.
19.
Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
14, 18, PL
20.
C :∅Smith 10(Jones)→(
Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
)
8–19, LDT
21.
Smith kC →C :∅Smith 10(Jones)→(Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
) 7–20, LDT
22.
W :AHR job(Jones)→
Smith kC →C :∅Smith 10(Jones)→(Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
)
 2–21, LDT
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23. `LiP
Smith k {[W ]}HR →
W :AHR job(Jones)→
Smith kC →C :∅Smith 10(Jones)→(Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
)

 1–22,
LDT
24. `LiP
(
Smith k {[W ]}HR ∧W :AHR job(Jones)
∧ Smith kC ∧ C :∅Smith 10(Jones)
)
→(
Smith k (C, {[W ]}HR) ∧
(C, {[W ]}HR) :∅Smith (job(Jones) ∧ 10(Jones))
) 23, PL.
In the preceding proof, observe the use of the law of proof extension, deducible by
means of epistemic antitonicity, and expressing the monotonicity of LiP-proofs.
Like Arte¨mov, who interprets Lehrer and Paxson’s indefeasibility condition for
justified true belief as possibly corresponding to LP’s sum-axiom (cf. [Art08a]),
we could thus interpret this condition as corresponding to LiP’s proof extension.
Corollary 7 (Gettier-example with signing). Given A := {Smith, Jones, HR},
{(job(Smith) ∧ job(Jones))→ ⊥}; ∅ `LiP(
Smith k {[W ]}HR ∧ (W :AHR job(Jones))
∧ Smith kC ∧ C :∅Smith 10(Jones)
)
→
((job(Smith) ∧ 10(Smith))→ ⊥)
Proof. From Proposition 14 and Lemma 3.
4.4 Multi-agent LP-like systems
By their quality of being conservative extensions of non-interactive LP-like sys-
tems, the following logical systems with multi-agent character inherit the lack
of message-passing interactivity of LP in the following senses: namely the lack
of (1) a sound truth axiom for message passing (cf. Section 4.1.1), (2) the trans-
ferability of local truths by means of messages (cf. Section 4.2.2), and (3) sig-
nature checking that could act as proof checking of claimed local truths (cf.
Section 4.1.2). In our understanding, these lacks of LP-like systems without
message passing are reflected by the fact that LP can only homomorph but not
embed into interactive-proof systems with message passing like LiP.
4.4.1 LP2
Yavorskaya’s LP2 [Yav08] is an extension of LP with multi-agent character in
the sense that LP2 extends LP with a 2-agent view such that each one of the
two agents
1. has her own proof-sum, proof-application, and proof-checker constructor
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2. may have a constructor for
(a) checking the other agent’s proofs, that is, peer proofs
(b) converting peer proofs into proofs of her own.
LP2 being an extension of LP, our criticism of LP also applies to LP2. Also, LiP
can manage an n-agent view for arbitrary n ∈ N with only n+1 (transmittable)
proof-term constructors (n signature constructors plus 1 pair constructor). This
feature is the fruit of our design decision to equip LiP with proof-term signa-
ture constructors and an agent-parametric proof modality, which allows the
association as proof of arbitrary data to arbitrary verifying agents within ar-
bitrary peer communities. Whereas an extension of LP2 to LPn for a fixed
n ∈ N would require 3n+ 2n(n− 1) = 2n2 + n constructors (n proof-sum plus
n proof-application plus n proof-checker plus n(n − 1) peer-proof-checker plus
n(n− 1) peer-proof-conversion constructors), and still not allow the free associ-
ation of proofs to agents. In sum, LiP seems more appropriate for interactivity
and is even simpler than would be LPn. However, it could be interesting to
parametrise Yavorskaya’s agent-centric proof converters with agent communities
so that two communities that do not share their respective common knowledge
of what should constitute a proof could communicate with each other thanks to
such communal proof converters.
4.4.2 UL
Renne’s UL [Ren12] is an extension of Arte¨mov’s Justification Logic, JL [Art08a]
(including Arte¨mov’s LP) with multi-agent character in the sense that UL com-
bines JL with (multi-agent) Dynamic Epistemic Logic [vDvdHK07]. Of course,
dynamic extensions of static logics are interesting. The sophisticated language
of UL is defined by staged mutual recursion on the structure of terms and formu-
las, and has a semantic interface in the style of LP but only over finite Kripke-
models. The mutual recursion arises in the application term constructor of UL,
which has a formula parameter meant to indicate the relevance of the second
constructor argument to the constructor parameter in UL’s application axiom.
Given that sum and application can be subsumed by pairing in LiP (cf. Sec-
tion 4.1.2), it would be interesting to experiment with a formula-parametrised
pair constructor in UL intended to subsume sum and formula-parametrised ap-
plication. The justification terms in UL do not provide evidence for knowledge
but only for belief, which is expressed with a K4-modality. (Usually, belief is
expressed with a KD45-modality [MV07].)
5 Conclusion
5.1 Assessment
We have proposed a logic of interactive proofs with as main contributions those
described in Section 1.4.1. Our resulting notion of proofs has the advantage
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of being not only operational thanks to a proof-theoretic definition but also
declarative thanks to a complementary model-theoretic definition that gives a
constructive epistemic semantics to proofs in the sense of explicating what—
knowledge, as well as skill by means of mobile code—proofs effect in agents, com-
plementing thereby the (operational) axiomatics, which explicates how proofs
do so. In particular, first, interactive computation is semantic computation: we
not only compute result values (syntax), but (knowledge) equivalence classes
of them (semantics); and, second, our definition of interactive proofs reflects
the impact of mathematical proofs in a social sense (cf. Section 1.2.1): if my
peer knew my proof for her of a given statement then she would know that the
statement is true. (Notice the different kinds of knowledge and the conditional
mode!) In contrast, the traditional definition of (mathematical) proofs is only
operational in the sense that proofs are defined purely in terms of the deductive
operations that are used to construct them. Their pragmatics, that is, their
(epistemic) impact in proof-checking agents, was left unformalised, and their
operational definition risks restricting their generality. However now thanks to
our formalisation, we as a community have the formal common knowledge that
• agents in distributed systems are at the same time computation oracles,
data miners, knowledge processors, meaning interpreters, message-passing
communicators, interactive provers, and logical combinators;
• a proof is that which if known to one of our peer members would
induce the knowledge of its proof goal with that member.
5.2 Future work
Our future lines of research for LiP are the following:
1. develop the proof theory of LiP (alternative calculi, proof complexity);
2. extend LiP with guarded quantifiers (gFOLiP), dynamic modalities, and
fixpoint operators (Hennessy-Milner correspondence, characteristic formu-
las);
3. extend LiP with the classical and the modern conception of cryptography
mentioned in Footnote 10 (requiring resource-bounded agents);
4. apply LiP and its variants to the analysis and synthesis of communica-
tion protocols (proof-carrying code correct by construction via program
extraction from constructive proofs of correctness, on-line interactive al-
gorithms);
5. create the Logic of Evidence and the Logic of Deception suggested on
Page 28.
Applying LiP means fixing four things if need be, namely, at the level of
1. terms:
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(a) the choice of term axioms,
(b) the application-specific base data B,
(c) the implementation of signing, e.g., in terms of public-key cryptog-
raphy;
2. formulas: the set P of atomic propositions (those besides a kM) together
with the axioms governing their intended meaning.
This will instantiate LiP as a theory of the specific subject matter of the appli-
cation, such as, for example, Dolev-Yao cryptography (cf. Page 15).
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A Completeness proof
Completeness For all φ ∈ L, if |= φ then `LiP φ.
Proof. Let
• W designate the set of all maximally LiP-consistent sets17
• for all w,w′ ∈ W, w MCCa w′ :iff { φ ∈ L | M :Ca φ ∈ w } ⊆ w′
• for all w ∈ W, w ∈ VC(P ) :iff P ∈ w.
Then MC := (W, {MCCa}M∈M,a∈A,C⊆A,VC) designates the canonical model for
LiP. Following Fitting [Fit07, Section 2.2], the following useful property of MC,
for all φ ∈ L and w ∈ W, φ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ,
the so-called Truth Lemma, can be proved by induction on the structure of φ:
1. Base case (φ := P for P ∈ P). For all w ∈ W, P ∈ w if and only if
MC, w |= P , by definition of VC.
2. Inductive step (φ := ¬φ′ for φ′ ∈ L). Suppose that for all w ∈ W, φ′ ∈ w
if and only if MC, w |= φ′. Further let w ∈ W. Then, ¬φ′ ∈ w if and
only if φ′ 6∈ w — w is consistent — if and only if MC, w 6|= φ′ — by the
induction hypothesis — if and only if MC, w |= ¬φ′.
17* A set W of LiP-formulas is maximally LiP-consistent :iff W is LiP-consistent and W has
no proper superset that is LiP-consistent. A set W of LiP-formulas is LiP-consistent :iff W is
not LiP-inconsistent. A set W of LiP-formulas is LiP-inconsistent :iff there is a finite W ′ ⊆W
such that ((
∧
W ′)→ ⊥) ∈ LiP. Any LiP-consistent set can be extended to a maximally LiP-
consistent set by means of the Lindenbaum Construction [Fit07, Page 90]. A set is maximally
LiP-consistent if and only if the set of logical-equivalence classes of the set is an ultrafilter of
the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of LiP [Ven07, Page 351]. The canonical frame is isomorphic
to the ultrafilter frame of that Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra [Ven07, Page 352].
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3. Inductive step (φ := φ′ ∧ φ′′ for φ′, φ′′ ∈ L). Suppose that for all w ∈ W,
φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ′, and that for all w ∈ W, φ′′ ∈ w if
and only if MC, w |= φ′′. Further let w ∈ W. Then, φ′ ∧ φ′′ ∈ w if
and only if (φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w), because w is maximal. Now suppose
that φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w. Hence, MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′, by the
induction hypotheses, and thusMC, w |= φ′∧φ′′. Conversely, suppose that
MC, w |= φ′∧φ′′. Then, MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′. Hence, φ′ ∈ w and
φ′′ ∈ w, by the induction hypotheses. Thus, (φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w) if and
only if (MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′). Whence φ′ ∧ φ′′ ∈ w if and only if
(MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′), by transitivity.
4. Inductive step (φ := M :Ca φ
′ for M ∈M, a ∈ A, C ⊆ A, and φ′ ∈ L).
4.1 for all w ∈ W, φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ′ ind. hyp.
4.2 w ∈ W hyp.
4.3 M :Ca φ
′ ∈ w hyp.
4.4 w′ ∈ W hyp.
4.5 w MC
C
a w
′ hyp.
4.6 { φ′′ ∈ L | M :Ca φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ w′ 4.5
4.7 φ′ ∈ { φ′′ ∈ L | M :Ca φ′′ ∈ w } 4.3, 4.6
4.8 φ′ ∈ w′ 4.6, 4.7
4.9 MC, w
′ |= φ′ 4.1, 4.4, 4.8
4.10 if w MC
C
a w
′ then MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.5–4.9
4.11 for all w′ ∈ W, if w MCCa w′ then MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.4–4.10
4.12 MC, w |= M :Ca φ′ 4.11
4.13 M :Ca φ
′ 6∈ w hyp.
4.14 F = { φ′′ ∈ L | M :Ca φ′′ ∈ w } ∪ {¬φ′} hyp.
4.15 F is LiP-inconsistent hyp.
4.16 there is {M :Ca φ1, . . . ,M :Ca φn} ⊆ w such that
`LiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ∧ ¬φ′)→ ⊥ 4.14, 4.15
4.17 {M :Ca φ1, . . . ,M :Ca φn} ⊆ w and
`LiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ∧ ¬φ′)→ ⊥ hyp.
4.18 `LiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn)→ φ′ 4.17
4.19 `LiP (M :Ca (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn))→M :Ca φ′ 4.18, R
4.20 `LiP ((M :Ca φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (M :Ca φn))→M :Ca φ′ 4.19
4.21 M :Ca φ
′ ∈ w 4.17, 4.20, w is maximal
4.22 false 4.13, 4.21
4.23 false 4.16, 4.17–4.22
4.24 F is LiP-consistent 4.15–4.23
4.25 there is w′ ⊇ F s.t. w′ is maximally LiP-consistent 4.24
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4.26 F ⊆ w′ and w′ is maximally LiP-consistent hyp.
4.27 { φ′′ ∈ L | M :Ca φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ F 4.14
4.28 { φ′′ ∈ L | M :Ca φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ w′ 4.26, 4.27
4.29 w MC
C
a w
′ 4.28
4.30 w′ ∈ W 4.26
4.31 ¬φ′ ∈ F 4.14
4.32 ¬φ′ ∈ w′ 4.26, 4.31
4.33 φ′ 6∈ w′ 4.26 (w′ is LiP-consistent), 4.32
4.34 MC, w
′ 6|= φ′ 4.1, 4.33
4.35 there is w′ ∈ W s.t. w MCCa w′ and MC, w′ 6|= φ′ 4.29, 4.34
4.36 MC, w 6|= M :Ca φ′ 4.35
4.37 MC, w 6|= M :Ca φ′ 4.25, 4.26–4.36
4.38 MC, w 6|= M :Ca φ′ 4.14–4.37
4.39 M :Ca φ
′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= M :Ca φ′ 4.3–4.12, 4.13–4.38
4.40 for all w ∈ W, M :Ca φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= M :Ca φ′ 4.2–4.39
With the Truth Lemma we can now prove that for all φ ∈ L, if 6`LiP φ then
6|= φ. Let φ ∈ L, and suppose that 6`LiP φ. Thus, {¬φ} is LiP-consistent, and can
be extended to a maximally LiP-consistent set w, that is, ¬φ ∈ w ∈ W. Hence
MC, w |= ¬φ, by the Truth Lemma. Thus: MC, w 6|= φ, MC 6|= φ, and 6|= φ.
That is, MC is a universal (for all φ ∈ L) counter-model (if φ is a non-theorem
then MC falsifies φ).
We are left to prove that MC is also an LiP-model. So let us instantiate our
data mining operator cla (cf. Page 22) on W by letting for all w ∈ W
msgsa(w) := { M | a kM ∈ w }.
Then, let us prove that:
1. if for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, w {[M ]}aC
C∪{a}
b w
′ then M ∈ clw′a (∅)
2. if M ∈ clwa (∅) then w MCCa w
3. there is w′ ∈ W such that w MCCa w′
4. for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, ({[M ]}aC
C∪{a}
b ◦MCCa) ⊆ MCCa
5. if C ⊆ C′ then MCCa ⊆ MCC
′
a
6. if M ≤a M ′ then MCCa ⊆ M ′CCa
For (1), let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that for all b ∈ C ∪ {a}, w {[M ]}aC
C∪{a}
b w
′.
That is, for all b ∈ C ∪ {a} and φ ∈ L, if {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Since
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w is maximal,
(
∧
b∈C∪{a}
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM) ∈ w (authentic knowledge).
Hence a kM ∈ w′, by modus ponens, and thus M ∈ clw′a (∅) by definition.
For (2), let w ∈ W and suppose that M ∈ clwa (∅). Hence a kM ∈ w due to
the maximality of w, which contains all the term axioms corresponding to the
defining clauses of clwa . Further suppose that M :
C
a φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal,
(M :Ca φ)→ (a kM → φ) ∈ w (epistemic truthfulness).
Hence, a kM → φ ∈ w, and φ ∈ w, by consecutive modus ponens.
For (3), let w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, and suppose that M :Ca φ ∈ w. For the
sake of deriving the contrary, further suppose that φ 6∈ w. Hence ¬φ ∈ w
because w is maximal, and thus φ→ ⊥ ∈ w. Hence (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca ⊥ ∈ w by
regularity. Hence M :Ca ⊥ ∈ w by the first supposition and modus ponens. Hence
¬(M :Ca ⊥) 6∈ w because w is consistent. Yet since w is maximal, ¬(M :Ca ⊥) ∈ w
(proof consistency). Contradiction. Hence w is actually a w′ such that φ ∈ w′.
For (4), suppose that b ∈ C ∪ {a} and let w,w′, w′′ ∈ W. Further suppose
that w {[M ]}aC
C∪{a}
b w
′ (i.e., for all φ ∈ L, if {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′)
and w′ MCCa w
′′ (i.e., for all φ ∈ L, if M :Ca φ ∈ w′ then φ ∈ w′′). Furthermore
suppose that M :Ca φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal,
(M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (M :Ca φ) ∈ w,
as a direct consequence of peer review and proof conjunctions. Hence, applying
modus ponens consecutively,
∧
b∈C∪{a} {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (M :Ca φ) ∈ w by the fourth
supposition, M :Ca φ ∈ w′ by the second supposition, and finally φ ∈ w′′ by the
third supposition.
For (5), let C′ ⊆ A and suppose that C ⊆ C′. That is, C ∪ C′ = C′. Further,
let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCCa w′. That is, for all φ ∈ L, if M :Ca φ ∈ w
then φ ∈ w′. Furthermore, let φ ∈ L and suppose that M :C′a φ ∈ w. Thus
M :C∪C
′
a φ ∈ w by the first supposition. Since w is maximal,
(M :C∪C
′
a φ)→M :Ca φ ∈ w (group decomposition).
Hence M :Ca φ ∈ w by modus ponens, and thus φ ∈ w′ by the second supposition.
For (6), suppose that M ≤a M ′. That is, for all w ∈ W, if M ∈ clwa (∅)
then M ′ ∈ clwa (∅). Hence for all w ∈ W, if a kM ∈ w then a kM ′ ∈ w due to
the maximality of w′, which contains all the term axioms corresponding to the
defining clauses of clwa . Hence for all w ∈ W, if MC, w |= a kM then MC, w |=
a kM ′, by the Truth Lemma. Thus for all w ∈ W, MC, w |= a kM → a kM ′.
Hence for all w ∈ W, a kM → a kM ′ ∈ w by the Truth Lemma. Hence the
following intermediate result, called IR,
for all w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, (M :Ca φ)→M ′ :Ca φ ∈ w,
by epistemic antitonicity. Further, let w,w′ ∈ W. Hence,
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• w MCCa w′ by definition if and only if
• (for all φ ∈ L, if M :Ca φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′), which by IR implies
• (for all φ ∈ L, if M ′ :Ca φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′) by definition if and only if
• w M ′CCa w′.
B Other proofs
Let “PT” abbreviate “classical propositional tautology” and “PL” “classical
propositional logic”, and let PT and PL refer to the propositional fragment of
LiP only.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
1. (a) `LiP a k (M,M ′)→ (a kM ∧ a kM ′) unpairing
(b) `LiP (a kM ∧ a kM ′)→ a kM PT
(c) `LiP a k (M,M ′)→ a kM a, b, PL.
2. Symmetrically to 1.
3. (a) `LiP a k (M,M)→ a kM left or right projection
(b) `LiP a kM → (a kM ∧ a kM) PT
(c) `LiP (a kM ∧ a kM)→ a k (M,M) pairing
(d) `LiP a kM → a k (M,M) b, c, PL
(e) `LiP a k (M,M)↔ a kM a, d, PL.
4. (a) `LiP (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′) [un]pairing
(b) `LiP (a kM ′ ∧ a kM)↔ a k (M ′,M) [un]pairing
(c) `LiP (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ (a kM ′ ∧ a kM) PT
(d) `LiP a k (M,M ′)↔ a k (M ′,M) a, b, c, PL.
5. (a) `LiP (a kM → a kM ′)↔ (a kM → (a kM ∧ a kM ′)) PT
(b) `LiP (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′) [un]pairing
(c) `LiP (a kM → a kM ′)↔ (a kM → a k (M,M ′)) a, b, PL
(d) `LiP a k (M,M ′)→ a kM left projection
(e) `LiP (a kM → a kM ′)↔ (a k (M,M ′)↔ a kM) c, d, PL.
6. (a) `LiP a k a knowledge of one’s own name
(b) `LiP a k a→ (a kM → a k a) PT
(c) `LiP a kM → a k a b, c, PL
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(d) `LiP (a kM → a k a)↔ (a k (M,a)↔ a kM) neutral pair elements
(e) `LiP a k (M,a)↔ a kM c, d, PL.
7. (a) `LiP (a kM ∧ a k (M ′,M ′′))↔ a k (M, (M ′,M ′′)) [un]pairing
(b) `LiP (a kM ′ ∧ a kM ′′)↔ a k (M ′,M ′′) [un]pairing
(c) `LiP (a kM ∧ (a kM ′ ∧ a kM ′′))↔ a k (M, (M ′,M ′′)) a, b, PL
(d) `LiP (a kM ∧ (a kM ′ ∧ a kM ′′))↔ ((a kM ∧ a kM ′) ∧ a kM ′′) PT
(e) `LiP ((a kM ∧ a kM ′) ∧ a kM ′′)↔ a k (M, (M ′,M ′′)) c, d, PL
(f) `LiP (a kM ∧ a kM ′)↔ a k (M,M ′) [un]pairing
(g) `LiP (a k (M,M ′) ∧ a kM ′′)↔ a k (M, (M ′,M ′′)) e, f, PL
(h) `LiP (a k (M,M ′) ∧ a kM ′′)↔ a k ((M,M ′),M ′′) [un]pairing
(i) `LiP a k (M, (M ′,M ′′))↔ a k ((M,M ′),M ′′) g, h, PL.
8. By propositional logic and epistemic antitonicity.
• 9–10 and 17 follow directly from epistemic antitonicity and the correspond-
ing pairing laws and signature synthesis, respectively.
11. By propositional logic directly from proof extension left and right.
• 12–13 and 15–16 follow directly from epistemic bitonicity and the corre-
sponding pairing laws by propositional logic.
14. (a) `LiP a kM → a kM ′ hypothesis
(b) `LiP (a kM → a kM ′)↔ (a k (M,M ′)↔ a kM) neutral pair
elements
(c) `LiP a k (M,M ′)↔ a kM a, b, PL
(d) {a k (M,M ′)↔ a kM} `LiP (M,M ′) :Ca φ↔M :Ca φ epistemic
bitonicity
(e) `LiP (M,M ′) :Ca φ↔M :Ca φ c, d, PL
(f) {a kM → a kM ′} `LiP (M,M ′) :Ca φ↔M :Ca φ a–e, definition.
18. (a) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨ b :Ca φ)→ (M, b) :Ca φ proof extension
(b) `LiP a k {[M ]}b → a k (M, b) signature analysis
(c) `LiP ((M, b) :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}b :Ca φ b, epistemic antitoncity
(d) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨ b :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}b :Ca φ a, c, PL.
19. (a) `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ self-signing elimination
(b) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨ a :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}a :Ca φ signing introduction
(c) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}a :Ca φ b, PL
(d) `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ a, c, PL.
20. Suppose that A = {a} and M\ {Ka, Sa}.
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(a) Let us proceed by induction over M ∈M.
i. base case, that is, M := b, for b ∈ A. Hence b = a, and thus
`LiP a k b because `LiP a k a.
ii. inductive step for M := {[M ′]}b, for M ′ ∈ M and b ∈ A. Hence
b = a, and thus `LiP a kM ′ → a k {[M ′]}b because `LiP a kM ′ →
a k {[M ′]}a. Suppose that `LiP a kM ′. Hence `LiP a k {[M ′]}b, by
modus ponens.
iii. inductive step for M := (M ′,M ′′), for M ′,M ′′ ∈ M. Suppose
that `LiP a kM ′ and `LiP a kM ′′. Hence `LiP a kM ′∧a kM ′′, by
propositional logic. Now, `LiP (a kM ′∧a kM ′′)→ a k (M ′,M ′′),
and hence `LiP a k (M ′,M ′′), by modus ponens.
(b) i. `LiP a k (M,M ′) total knowledge
ii. `LiP a kM ∧ a kM ′ i, unpairing
iii. `LiP a kM ↔ a kM ′ ii, propositional logic.
(c) Jointly from b and epistemic bitonicity by propositional logic.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
1. (a) `LiP (M :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ→ φ′) proof extension
(b) `LiP ((M,M ′) :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ (((M,M ′) :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ′) K
(c) `LiP (M :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ (((M,M ′) :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ′) a, b, PL
(d) `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ)→ (M ′,M) :Ca φ proof extension
(e) `LiP ((M ′,M) :Ca φ)↔ (M,M ′) :Ca φ proof commutativity
(f) `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ d, e, PL
(g) `LiP (M :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ ((M ′ :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ′) c, f, PL.
2. (a) {φ→ φ′} ⊆ LiP hypothesis
(b) (φ→ φ′) ∈ LiP a, definition
(c) `LiP φ→ φ′ b, definition
(d) `LiP M :Ca (φ→ φ′) c, N
(e) `LiP (M :Ca (φ→ φ′))→ ((M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′) K
(f) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′ d, e, PL
(g) ((M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′) ∈ LiP f, definition
(h) {φ→ φ′} `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′ a–g, definition.
3. (a) {φ↔ φ′} ⊆ LiP hypothesis
(b) (φ↔ φ′) ∈ LiP a, definition
(c) `LiP φ↔ φ′ b, definition
(d) `LiP φ→ φ′ c, PL
(e) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ′ d, R
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(f) `LiP φ′ → φ c, PL
(g) `LiP (M :Ca φ′)→M :Ca φ f, R
(h) `LiP (M :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ′ e, g, PL
(i) ((M :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ′) ∈ LiP h, definition
(j) {φ↔ φ′} `LiP (M :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ′ a–i, definition.
4. By regularity, epistemic antitonicity, and the transitivity of ‘→’.
5. By epistemic regularity and propositional logic.
6. (a) `LiP (M :Ca (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)))→ ((M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∧ φ′)) GK
(b) `LiP φ→ (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)) PT
(c) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)) b, R
(d) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ ((M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∧ φ′)) a, c, PL
(e) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∧M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) d, PL.
7. (a) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :Ca φ′)→ (M,M) :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) proof conjunctions
(b) `LiP ((M,M) :Ca (φ ∧ φ′))↔M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) proof idempotency
(c) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :Ca φ′)→M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) a, b, PL
(d) `LiP (φ ∧ φ′)→ φ PT
(e) `LiP M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′)→M :Ca φ d, R
(f) `LiP (φ ∧ φ′)→ φ′ PT
(g) `LiP (M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′))→M :Ca φ′ f, R
(h) `LiP (M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′))→ ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :Ca φ′) e, g, PL
(i) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :Ca φ′)↔M :Ca (φ ∧ φ′) c, h, PL.
8. (a) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ proof extension, right
(b) `LiP φ→ (φ ∨ φ′) PT
(c) `LiP ((M,M ′) :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) b, R
(d) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) a, c, PL
(e) `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca φ′ proof extension, left
(f) `LiP φ′ → (φ ∨ φ′) PT
(g) `LiP ((M,M ′) :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) f, R
(h) `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ′)→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) e, g, PL
(i) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨ (M ′ :Ca φ′))→ (M,M ′) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) d, h, PL.
9. (a) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨M :Ca φ′)→ (M,M) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) proof disjunctions
(b) `LiP ((M,M) :Ca (φ ∨ φ′))↔M :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) proof idempotency
(c) `LiP ((M :Ca φ) ∨M :Ca φ′)→M :Ca (φ ∨ φ′) a, b, PL.
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10. (a) `LiP a k a knowledge of one’s own name
(b) `LiP > a, definition
(c) `LiP M :Ca > b, N.
11. (a) `LiP (a :Ca φ)→ (a k a→ φ) epistemic truthfulness
(b) `LiP a k a knowledge of one’s own name
(c) `LiP a k a→ ((a k a→ φ)→ φ) PT
(d) `LiP (a k a→ φ)→ φ b, c, PL
(e) `LiP (a :Ca φ)→ φ a, d, PL.
12. (a) {φ} `LiP a :Ca φ N
(b) {a :Ca φ} ⊆ LiP hypothesis
(c) (a :Ca φ) ∈ LiP b, definition
(d) `LiP a :Ca φ c, definition
(e) `LiP (a :Ca φ)→ φ self-truthfulness
(f) `LiP φ d, e, PL
(g) {a :Ca φ} `LiP φ b–f, definition
(h) φ a`LiP a :Ca φ a, g, definition.
13. (a) `LiP M :Ca > anything can prove tautological truth
(b) `LiP (M :Ca >)→ ¬(M :Ca ¬>) proof consistency
(c) `LiP ¬(M :Ca ¬>) a, b, PL
(d) `LiP ¬(M :Ca ⊥) c, definition.
14. (a) `LiP (M :Ca >)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca >)) peer
review
(b) `LiP M :Ca > anything can prove tautological truth
(c) `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca >)) a, b, PL
(d) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca >))→ {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM proof
conjunction bis
(e) `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM) c, d, PL.
15. (a) `LiP {[M ]}a :∅∪{a}a a kM authentic knowledge
(b) `LiP ({[M ]}a :∅∪{a}a a kM)→ {[M ]}a :∅a a kM group decomposition
(c) `LiP {[M ]}a :∅a a kM a, b, PL
(d) `LiP ({[M ]}a :∅a a kM)→M :∅a a kM self-signing elimination
(e) `LiP M :∅a a kM c, d, PL.
16. (a) `LiP a kM → φ hypothesis
67
(b) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM)→ {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ a, R
(c) `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b a kM) authentic knowledge
(d) `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) b, c, PL
(e) `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) hypothesis
(f) `LiP {[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ e, PL
(g) `LiP {[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ→ (a k {[M ]}a → φ) epistemic truthfulness
(h) `LiP a k {[M ]}a → φ f, g, PL
(i) `LiP a kM → a k {[M ]}a signature synthesis
(j) `LiP a kM → φ h, i, PL
(k) `LiP a kM → φ iff `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) a–d, e–j, PL
(l) a kM → φ a`LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) k, definition.
17. By instantiating φ with a kM ′ in AEN.
18. Like AEN but by invoking self-knowledge instead of authentic knowledge.
19. By instantiating φ with a kM ′ in SEN.
20. (a) `LiP
∧
a∈C∪{b}({[M ]}b :C∪{b}a b kM) authentic knowledge
(b) `LiP a k {[M ]}b → b kM a, AEN bis.
21. (a) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ))peer review
(b) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ (a kM → φ) epistemic truthfulness
(c) `LiP (a kM ∧M :Ca φ)→ φ b, PL
(d) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ))→ {[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ c, R
(e) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) a, d, PL.
22. (a) `LiP (M :C∪C′a φ)→ (M :Ca φ) group decomposition
(b) `LiP (M :C∪C′a φ)↔ (M :C
′∪C
a φ) C ∪ C′ = C′ ∪ C
(c) `LiP (M :C′∪Ca φ)→ (M :C
′
a φ) group decomposition
(d) `LiP (M :C∪C′a φ)→ (M :C
′
a φ) b, c, PL
(e) `LiP (M :C∪C′a φ)→ ((M :Ca φ) ∧M :C
′
a φ) a, d, PL.
23. (a) `LiP (M :C∪{a}a φ)→ (M :Ca φ) group decomposition
(b) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) simple peer review
(c) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ a ∈ C ∪ {a}, b, PL
(d) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ)↔M :C∪{a}a φ self-signing idempotency
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(e) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :C∪{a}a φ c, d, PL
(f) `LiP (M :C∪{a}a φ)↔M :Ca φ a, e, PL.
24. (a) `LiP a kM → ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) epistemic truthfulness, PL
(b) `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca a kM)→ {[M ]}a :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) a, R
(c) `LiP {[M ]}a :C∪{a}a a kM authentic knowledge
(d) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}a a kM)↔ {[M ]}a :Ca a kM self-neutral group
element
(e) `LiP {[M ]}a :Ca a kM c, d, PL
(f) `LiP {[M ]}a :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) b, e, PL
(g) `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ))↔M :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) self-signing
idempotency
(h) `LiP M :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) f, g, PL.
25. By the necessitation of the law that nothing can prove falsehood.
26. (a) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ))peer review
(b) b ∈ C ∪ {a} hypothesis
(c) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) simple peer review
(d) `LiP (a kM ∧M :Ca φ)→
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ) c, PL
(e) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ))→
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ))
d, R
(f) `LiP
∧
b∈C∪{a}(({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (a kM ∧M :Ca φ))→
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ)))
b–e, PL
(g) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ)))
a, f, PL
(h) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→
{[M ]}a :C∪{a}a (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ))
a ∈ C ∪ {a}, g, PL
(i) `LiP {[M ]}a :C∪{a}a (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ))↔
{[M ]}a :Ca (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ))
self-neutral group
element
(j) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→ {[M ]}a :Ca (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ)) h, i, PL
(k) `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ)))↔
M :Ca (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ))
self-signing
idempotency
(l) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca (
∧
b∈C∪{a}({[M ]}a :C∪{a}b φ)) j, k, PL.
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27. (a) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ) simple peer review bis
(b) `LiP ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ)↔ {[M ]}a :Ca φ self-neutral group element
(c) `LiP (M :Ca ({[M ]}a :C∪{a}a φ))↔M :Ca ({[M ]}a :Ca φ) b, R bis
(d) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca ({[M ]}a :Ca φ) a, c, PL
(e) `LiP ({[M ]}a :Ca φ)↔M :Ca φ self-signing idempotency
(f) `LiP (M :Ca ({[M ]}a :Ca φ))↔M :Ca (M :Ca φ) e, R bis
(g) `LiP (M :Ca φ)→M :Ca (M :Ca φ) d, f, PL
(h) `LiP M :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ) self-proof of truthfulness
(i) `LiP (M :Ca ((M :Ca φ)→ φ))→ ((M :Ca (M :Ca φ))→M :Ca φ) K
(j) `LiP (M :Ca (M :Ca φ))→M :Ca φ h, i, PL
(k) `LiP (M :Ca (M :Ca φ))↔M :Ca φ g, j, PL.
28. Like the proofs of self-truthfulness and self-truthfulness bis, but by invok-
ing the law of total knowledge.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 8
By induction on the structure of T :
• Base cases (T ∈ {x}x∈X ∪ {Ka, Sa}a∈A ): let T1, T2 ∈ T and α1, α2 ∈ A∗,
and suppose that T
α1−→ T1 and T α2−→ T2. Hence, α1 = α2 =  and
T1 = T2 = T , because term variables x and basic combinators Ka and
Sa reduce only through the empty word  — to themselves only. Thus
T1
−→ T and T2 −→ T . Hence, there are T ′ ∈ T and α′1, α′2 ∈ A∗ such
that T1
α′1−→ T ′ and T2 α
′
2−→ T ′.
• Inductive step (T = (U, V ) for U, V ∈ T ): let us make the induction
hypotheses about U and V that
1. for all U1, U2 ∈ T and β1, β2 ∈ A∗, if U β1−→ U1 and U β2−→ U2 then
there are U ′ ∈ T and β′1, β′2 ∈ A∗ such that U1
β′1−→ U ′ and U2 β
′
2−→ U ′
2. for all V1, V2 ∈ T and γ1, γ2 ∈ A∗, if V γ1−→ V1 and V γ2−→ V2 then
there are V ′ ∈ T and γ′1, γ′2 ∈ A∗ such that V1
γ′1−→ V ′ and V2 γ
′
2−→ V ′.
Now, let T1, T2 ∈ T and α1, α2 ∈ A∗ and suppose that (U, V ) α1−→ T1 and
(U, V )
α2−→ T2. Let us proceed by disjunctive case analysis and
1. suppose that V is not consumed by U in (U, V )
α1−→ T1 and that V
is not consumed by U in (U, V )
α2−→ T2. That is, U and V reduce
independently in both cases. Hence, there are U1, V1, U2, V2 ∈ T such
that T1 = (U1, V1) and T2 = (U2, V2) as well as β1, γ1, β2, γ2 ∈ A∗
such that U
β1−→ U1 and V γ1−→ V1 and U β2−→ U2 and V γ2−→ V2.
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2. suppose that V is not consumed by U in (U, V )
α1−→ T1 but that
V is consumed by U in (U, V )
α2−→ T2. That is, U and V reduce
independently in the first but not in the second case. Hence on the
one hand, there are U1, V1 ∈ T such that T1 = (U1, V1) as well as
β1, γ1 ∈ A∗ such that U β1−→ U1 and V γ1−→ V1. On the other hand, V
can be consumed by U either as part of a term ((Ka,W ), V ) or as part
of a term (((Sa,W ), X), V ). In both cases, there are U2 ∈ T ((Ka,W )
and ((Sa,W ), X), respectively) and β2 ∈ A∗ such that U β2−→ U2 as
well as V2 = V ∈ T and γ2 =  ∈ A∗ such that V γ2−→ V2.
3. suppose that V is consumed by U in (U, V )
α1−→ T1 but that V is
not consumed by U in (U, V )
α2−→ T2, and proceed symmetrically to
Case 2.
4. suppose that V is consumed by U in (U, V )
α1−→ T1 and that V
is consumed by U in (U, V )
α2−→ T2. On both hands, V can be
consumed by U either as part of a term ((Ka,W ), V ) or as part of
a term (((Sa,W ), X), V ). In both cases of the first hand, there are
U1 ∈ T ((Ka,W ) and ((Sa,W ), X), respectively) and β1 ∈ A∗ such
that U
β1−→ U1 as well as V1 = V ∈ T and γ1 =  ∈ A∗ such that
V
γ1−→ V1. Similarly in both cases of the second hand, there are
U2 ∈ T ((Ka,W ) and ((Sa,W ), X), respectively) and β2 ∈ A∗ such
that U
β2−→ U2 as well as V2 = V ∈ T and γ2 =  ∈ A∗ such that
V
γ2−→ V2.
Hence in all four cases, there are U ′ ∈ T and β′1, β′2 ∈ A∗ such that
U1
β′1−→ U ′ and U2 β
′
2−→ U ′, and there are V ′ ∈ T and γ′1, γ′2 ∈ A∗ such
that V1
γ′1−→ V ′ and V2 γ
′
2−→ V ′, by the induction hypothesis. Hence,
(U ′, V ′) ∈ T and there are α′1, α′2 ∈ A∗ such that (U1, V1)
α′1−→ (U ′, V ′)
and (U2, V2)
α′2−→ (U ′, V ′). Thus, there are T ′ ∈ T and α′1, α′2 ∈ A∗ such
that T1
α′1−→ T ′ and T2 α
′
2−→ T ′, as required. (Note that in any case, U
cannot be consumed by V , by the definition of reduction.)
B.4 Proof of Theorem 9
By induction on the (staged) definition of iCL-reduction
α−→ :
(Stage α ∈ A) thus there is a ∈ A such that a = α ; thus α ∈ A∗. Further,
(Base case Ka) suppose that ((Ka, T ), T
′) a−→ T and Γ `TiCL
((Ka, T ), T
′) : ϕ. Further suppose that Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ′ for some
ϕ′ (without any restriction). Hence, Γ `TiCL Ka : ϕ→ (ϕ′ → ϕ) and
Γ `TiCL T : ϕ, by TiCL-typing.
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(Base case Sa) suppose that (((Sa, T ), T
′), T ′′) a−→ ((T, T ′′), (T ′, T ′′))
and Γ `TiCL (((Sa, T ), T ′), T ′′) : ϕ. Further suppose that Γ `TiCL
T ′′ : ϕ′′ for some ϕ′′ (without any restriction). Hence:
• Γ `TiCL Sa : ((ϕ′′ → (ϕ′ → ϕ))→ ((ϕ′′ → ϕ′)→ (ϕ′′ → ϕ))),
• Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ′′ → ϕ′,
• Γ `TiCL T : ϕ′′ → (ϕ′ → ϕ), and
• Γ `TiCL ((T, T ′′), (T ′, T ′′)) : ϕ,
by TiCL-typing.
(Inductive step) suppose that for all ϕ, if T
a−→ T ′ and Γ `TiCL T : ϕ
then Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ (induction hypothesis). Further suppose that
• (T, T ′′) a−→ (T ′, T ′′) and Γ `TiCL (T, T ′′) : ϕ′. Hence, first,
T
a−→ T ′ by the definition of iCL-reduction, and, second, Γ `TiCL
T : ϕ′′ → ϕ′ and Γ `TiCL T ′′ : ϕ′′ for some ϕ′′ (without any re-
striction), by TiCL-typing. Hence Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ′′ → ϕ′, by the
induction hypothesis. Hence Γ `TiCL (T ′, T ′′) : ϕ′, by TiCL-
typing.
• (T ′′, T ) a−→ (T ′′, T ′) and Γ `TiCL (T ′′, T ) : ϕ′. Hence, first,
T
a−→ T ′ by the definition of iCL-reduction, and, second,
Γ `TiCL T ′′ : ϕ′′ → ϕ′ and Γ `TiCL T : ϕ′′ for some ϕ′′ (with-
out any restriction), by TiCL-typing. Hence Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ′′, by
the induction hypothesis. Hence Γ `TiCL (T ′′, T ′) : ϕ′, by TiCL-
typing.
(Stage α ∈ A∗)
Base case (α = ) Suppose that T
−→ T ′ and Γ `TiCL T : ϕ. Hence
T = T ′, and thus Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ.
Inductive step Suppose that for all T, T ′ ∈ T , if T α−→ T ′ and Γ `TiCL
T : ϕ then Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ (induction hypothesis). Further suppose
that T
a·α−−→ T ′ and Γ `TiCL T : ϕ. Hence there is T ′′ ∈ T such that
T
a−→ T ′′ and T ′′ α−→ T ′. Hence Γ `TiCL T ′′ : ϕ, by the previous
stage. Hence Γ `TiCL T ′ : ϕ, by the induction hypothesis.
(Stage α ∈ Aω) For proving our statement about infinite words α ∈ Aω, say
P (α), it suffices to prove P for all finite approximations αn—the (observ-
able) finite prefixes of length n ∈ N—of α. Of course, finite prefixes are
finite words, and in the previous stage we have just proved that P is true
for all finite words. Hence, P is true for all infinite words α too.
C Singleton society
For A = {a} and M \ {Ka, Sa}, bear in mind that M is a function of A, and
that LiP has been designed for truly interactive cases, that is, cases where
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|A| > 1 and not for non-interactive or degenerately interactive cases, that is,
cases where |A| = 1. So when A = {a} and M \ {Ka, Sa}, M is actually
strictly smaller than when A ) {a}! In particular when |A| > 1, obviously
neither total knowledge nor epistemic indifference holds, nor does proof indiffer-
ence hold. For the fortunate failure of proof indifference when |A| > 1, consider
the following doubly minimal counter-example. Without loss of generality, let
A := {a, b} such that a 6= b. Then `LiP b :∅a a k b (instance of self-knowledge,
cf. Theorem 2), but 6`LiP a :∅a a k b intuitively, and also formally. Just imagine
a state in which a does not know b’s name string, cf. Definition 3 and 4; then
giving her her own name string, which she already knows anyway, will not make
her know b’s; and then apply the contraposition of axiomatic soundness, cf.
Theorem 6. The counter-example is doubly minimal in the sense that both the
involved proof terms (a and b are atomic terms) as well as the involved proof
goal (a k b is an atomic proposition about atomic terms) are minimal. Note
that we could of course conceive LiP without the a k a-axiom for some or even
all a ∈ A and arbitrary A. In particular when A = {a}, excluding a k a from
Γ1 definitely makes sense, since agent names really make sense only for non-
empty non-singleton societies. In such a system, say LiP−, obviously none of
the singleton-society laws of LiP would hold for a, and thus also non-interactive,
singleton-society examples (e.g., Kripke’s Red Barn Example in [Art08a]) could
be faithfully formalised. The price to pay for LiP− would be, first, the fail-
ure of the following laws: self-neutral pair element, self-neutral proof element,
and, cf. Theorem 2, self-truthfulness, and the left implication of self-truthfulness
bis; and thus, second, the impoverishment of the proof-term structure from an
idempotent commutative monoid (cf. Corollary 4) to an idempotent commuta-
tive semigroup (loss of the neutral element). (The failure of these laws does
not imply that their negation succeeds.) However, how this price is appreciated
eventually depends on the considered application. For example, the failure of
self-truthfulness could even be considered desirable: if we were to exclude a k a
from Γ1, we would actually exclude (M :
C
a φ) → φ from being a theorem in the
resulting logical system LiP− for all M ∈ M, like in the Go¨del-Lo¨b Logic of
(non-interactive) Provability GL [JdJ88, AB05].
D Atomic propositions
We partially (pre-)instantiate the set of atomic propositions of our logic with our
chosen propositional constants (primitives), and (as usual) give the possibility
of (further, post-)instantiating this set by means of propositional variables to
the users of our logic. Such a pre-instantiation (at definition time of the logic)
is not unusual (many authors choose at least ‘true’ as a predefined primitive),
and is of course compatible with substitution invariance (Proposition 1): in
particular, it does not matter (1) when, at definition time (pre) or at use time
(post), (2) how many (none, one, or more), nor (3) by what naming mecha-
nism (for example by means of our term constructors, nota bene even without
term variables) propositional variables of a logic are instantiated and thus fixed
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(made constant). Otherwise, (standard) propositional substitution would be a
flawed abstraction mechanism. What matters is that propositional constants
and variables are always treated as such, that is, not substitutable and substi-
tutable, respectively, which is of course what we do and our users must do. By
definition, the ‘substitution’ in ‘substitution invariance’ of course only applies to
what is propositionally substitutable (and properly changing this base does of
course not change the invariance property). Violating this standard precept by
mistreating propositional constants as (substitutable) variables can be misused
to wrongly prove the inconsistency of logical theories. For such a mistreatment
example, simply substitute the propositional constant ‘false’ for the (whole)
propositional constant and theorem ‘∅ ∈ {∅}’ in Set Theory, where ∅ designates
the empty set and the curly brackets are set term constructors. Similarly but
even more simply and wrongly, substitute ‘false’ for ‘true’ in any logical theory.
The present, still one-sentence formulation of the fourth bullet in Definition 1
replaces an earlier one that suffers from an accidental artefact that can create
confusion. The reader should mentally replace the corresponding formulation
in [Kra13], [Kra14], and [Kra15]. We stress that none of these papers nor the
present one relies on this unintended artefact, which thus is clearly acciden-
tal. Furthermore, we highlight for all four papers (as already done for [Kra15]
therein) that they describe independent (though of course related) constructions
in the sense of not relying on each other for their technical existence.
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